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I. STUDY CAVEAT
For the sake of completeness, due to the requirements governing this study,
topics are presented in this paper which pertain to a full implementation of a
simulation analysis. It is in no manner intended, by the discussion of traditional
aspects of a simulation analyisis such as measures of effectiveness, experimental
design, statistical considerations, or the presentation of sample inputs/outputs, etc.,
to mislead the reader.
The reader is cautioned that a full implementation of the simulation program
specified has NOT been accomplished. Correspondingly, no experiments were
conducted and no discussion of ACTUAL results was possible.
II. BACKGROUND
The importance of Antisubmarine Warfare(ASW) to the United States (U.S.)
national security seems to shift as challenges posed to maritime capability alternately
become blurred by more pressing world events or come strikingly into focus with the
introduction of a new technology exploitable by hostile interests.
...Technology today permits the development of non-nuclear submarines that
can use air-independent propulsion to remain quietly submerged for extended
periods without the need for noisy snorkel operations. Combining this type of
relatively low-cost submarine with modern cruise missiles, torpedoes and mines
results in a formidable Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) problem during
contingency operations in low-intensity conflicts and limited objectives warfare
around the globe.... [Ref. l:Inside Cover]
The author will cite certain credible sources in this section in order to build the
context which gave rise to this study. Current U.S. Navy ASW screening tactics seem
NOT to have adapted to the changed threat. The U.S. Navy cannot afford new
weapons systems merely on the basis of their technological feasibility, nor can it
maintain force structure at historical levels to preserve the international status quo.
The argument presented here is that new and relevant ASW screening tactics are
likely to be the most effective and the least costly means of minimizing submarine
threats to U.S. global maritime independence.
...I wish our antisubmarine warfare(ASW) forces could see how they look
through the periscope. There are strengths (new platforms and new hardware),
but there are also weaknesses, misperceptions, and missed opportunities.
Operating a submarine against a carrier today is too easy; the carrier's ASW
protection often resembles Swiss cheese. Fleet exercises demonstrate this time
and again, with the ASW prosecution frequently occuring only after the green
flares (1) have startled the carriers bridge watch. In short, the bad news is that
our ASW is needlessly weak; the good news is that our ASW can be improved...
(1) U.S. Navy submarines fire green flares in exercises when they reach attack
positions and have their fire control solutions. [Ref. 2:p. 39]
As far as this author has been able to discern, the current U.S. Navy training
doctrine does NOT call for a halt to flight operations even if green flares are landing
on the flight deck. The addage 'one fights the way one trains' is applicable here.
Not only are ASW screening tactics founded on an out-dated threat, but it seems that
submarines are not taken as serious threats by some U.S. Navy carrier commanding
officers. Granted maintaining flight proficiency is important, but if combat units are
not penalized for exercise mistakes, complacency is likely to PREVAIL.
...The goal of scouting is to help get weapons within range and aim them.
Scouting gathers information and reports it. The dominant trend in scouting
has been the increasing rate of search and the increasing range of
reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence gathering systems. The reason is
obvious; longer-range weapons demand these improvements. Less obvious is
the reason scouting has had to struggle to keep up. Weapons fire in any
direction...Double the range of an enemy's attack ...and you quadruple the area
to be searched. A barrier search-a scouting line-can sometimes cover the
perimeter of this expanded area. The bent-line screen invented late in World
War II to detect submarines in front of a carrier is an example. Still, tactical
commanders cannot be satisfied with a scouting line. For one thing, it is
usually pervious: submarines that can approach submerged and launch missiles
are a threat that seemingly springs from anywhere at or inside missile range.
For another, searches cannot be continuous... [Ref. 3:p. 166]
The threat of a submarine launched missile is not new and can be in the form
of a Sea Launched Cruise Missile, a turbojet version similar to a Harpoon , or a
missile-boosted torpedo commonly referred to as an ASW Stand Off Weapon. The
Soviet and French Navies have had these weapons for some time [Ref. 4:p. 184].
The Soviets have fired close to 700 sea-launched cruise missiles per year since 1986
[Ref. 5:p. 419]. Our own Department of Defense is on record as stating:
...The primary threats to the CVBG are...torpedoes and cruise missiles fired
from submarines... [Ref. 6:p. 130]
The submarine launching an attack need not develop its firing solution from its own
ORGANIC sensors. A former U.S. Naval intelligence officer, Karl Lautenschlager
asserts that the most important characteristic of the Soviet Oscar-class submarine is
not its great size but the likelihood that its missiles are guided by space-based sensors
[Ref. 3:p. 206].
This notion of a missile 'springing from anywhere' is quite alarming even if one
is a devout student of the operational art. Deception and surprise are necessary tools
in armed deadly conflict [Ref. 7]. If U.S. Navy carrier battlegroup ASW readiness
is indeed marginal, then the situation is even further confounded by the introduction
of new enemy tactics to coincide with the ferocious lethality of a surprise missile
attack.
The following is from a Soviet author:
...The range of means of fire, the high speed of approach to the target, and the
high probability of destruction (even considering counteraction) determine the
tactics of contemporary naval warfare, the sequence of operations by forces, the
organization of cooperation, and the time of performance of the combat
mission. The adoption of missiles by navies made it possible to significantly
increase the range of combat contact. The outcome of the battle now will
depend on the capabilities of the weapons, the distance at which target
indication is given, and the positional advantage. ..So surprise in naval wafare
plays a decisive role in its outcome. Experience from wars and combat training
is a good education for navy men. Unfortunately, when working through
missions and during combat practice and drills certain commanding officers do
not strive for surprise in action... [Ref.8]
The sinking of the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, by a Royal Navy
submarine during the Falklands conflict emphasizes the effectiveness of the
submarine. The official report reads as follows:
"211. Our nuclear-powered submarines(SSN) played a crucial role. After the
sinking of the General Belgrano the Argentine surface fleet effectively took no
further part in the Campaign. The SSN's were flexible and powerful instruments
throughout the crisis, posing a ubiquitous threat which the Argentines could
neither measure nor oppose. Their speed and independence of support meant
that they were the first assets to arrive in the South Atlantic, enabling us to
declare the maritime exclusion zone early. They also provided valuable
intelligence to our forces in the total exclusion zone." [Ref.9]
Within the last two years, the author has attended ASW courses at the Fleet
ASW Training Center, Atlantic, in Norfolk, VA. The bent-line ASW screening tactic
for carrier battlegroups was still being taught. The author objected that such a tactic
assumes superior speed of the carrier over that of the submarine and only a torpedo
threat. When asked what ASW tactics existed for a missile threat, the instructor's
response was that a launched missile is an Anti-Air Warfare(AAW) problem. This
was disconcerting.
Although this may be the ultimate and most realistic response to the missile
threat in the context of the combined warfare commanders, it seems appropriate to
task ASW elements with the responsibility of alerting their AAW counterparts in the
carrier battlegroup to the time and direction of the impending missile strike.
Continued concientious development of this effort to minimize the element of
sub-launched missile attack surprise could conceivably lead to better coordination
and newer methods of carrier battlegroup defense.
A reference currently in use at the U.S. Naval Academy and at the U.S. Naval
Postgraduate School, entitled 'Naval Operations Analysis'[Ref. 10], specifically
Chapters 10 and 11 (hereafter referred to as 'text') was the departure point for this
study of the ASW screening problem.
This text presents a classic elementary quantitative analysis of the bent-line
ASW screening tactic. Figure 1 is from Section 1007 of the text.
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Figure 1. The Submerged Approach Region
In Figure 1 R
c
is considered the feasible region for a successful torpedo atack.
by a submerged submarine. R
f
is the range at which the torpedo is fired. is the
angle measued, port or starboard, from the bow of the target ship to the intended
relative torpedo track. The probability that a torpedo fired from that point will hit
the target, given a firing range and angle on the bow, is P(R
f
,
O ). The boundary
between the convoy and the gray submerged approach region is labeled C to denote
any arbitary value for a contour representing a locus of points with a constant
probability of hit value. Let the submaring speed be a, the formation speed be 6,
and the relation of a < 13 hold. The submerged approach region is determined by an
angle i|f = sin" 1 (a/P) on either side of the target bow or formation heading. This
conceptualization of the ASW screening problem is the one to which this study is
directed. The thesis is that this subject needs to be revisited. In all fairness, the text's
authors do mention the tactical situation of potential carrier battlegroup vulnerability
from 360 degrees in the last sentence.
In the discussion which precedes Section 1007 above, the authors state correctly
that in order to maximize ship protection one must minimize the probability of hit
from an enemy weapon. The ensuing analysis, however, is built on the following
simplifying assumptions: namely,
1. a single submarine engagement (not likely);
2. a single salvo torpedo (i.e. no simultaneous arrivals) that acts like a bullet
(i.e. does not have home-on-target characteristics nor does it have a
proximity fuse);
3. a carrier speed which is much greater than that of the submarine, to which
the following thoughts apply:
...In peacetime the wartime advantage of more speed in combatant ships has
usually been overrated...Somehow peacetime planners fail to address the
tactical problem of a formation being tied to the slowest ship in the force. The
effect of damaged units on the speed of the force was and still is often
overlooked in peacetime tactical discussions...[Ref.3 p. 176]
4. a non-zigzaging or non-changing course (e.g. carriers must turn into the wind
to launch and recover aircraft); and, finally,
5. the proscribed bent-line offers no protection just outside the edges(it is hard
to believe that a 'zero or one' type of probability of hit exists on either side
of this boundary).
The text forthrightly further asserts,
...the combination of a pattern running torpedo (or salvo thereof) and a
multiplicity of targets is very difficult to evaluate this way... The development
and analysis of these more sophisticated models is beyond the scope of this
text... [Ref. 10:p. 206]
Given this state of affairs: that the predominant U.S. Navy ASW screening
tactic appears outdated and that an analytical approach to the new tactical situation
is, for this author, intractable; it was decided to undertake a simulation model and
analysis to gain further insight on the problem.
...Simulation is essentially a controlled statistical sampling
technique(experiment) that is used, in conjunction with a model, to obtain
approximate answers for questions about complex, multifactor probabilistic
problems. It is most useful when analytical and numerical techniques cannot
supply answers.... [Ref. 11: p. 9]
An experiment is taken to mean a series of controlled observations undertaken
in an artificial situation, with the deliberate manipulation of some variables, in order
to answer one or more questions.
III. PURPOSE
The primary purpose of this study was to specify and code a simulation model
with sufficient relevant detail, while retaining an essential conceptual simplicity, so
as to allow for an interesting and feasible investigation. The following description
expresses this need for balance:
...However, the more detail a model includes explicitly, the better we think the
model resembles reality. An additional reason for including detail is that it
offers increased opportunities for studying system response when a structural
relationship within the model is altered for investigative purpose. First, more
combinations of structural changes can be considered and, second, more aspects
of the response can be studied. On the other hand, detail generally makes
solution of problems difficult.... [Ref. 12:p. 3]
Additionally, it was hoped that a completed and verified model might actually
be produced by the author and used by other analysts to suggest improvements to the
U.S. Navy ASW screening doctrine.
As has been stated, all modules of program code have not been fully
implemented. Therefore, only the minimum goals have been acheived as a result of
this effort. The following discussion centers on the model specification and a
conceptual framework of an experimental design.
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rv. scope
A. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS
The following statement from Naval Operations Analysis [Ref. 10] forms the
basic assumption upon which this thesis rests:
...The placement of the screening units is the primary controllable variable. In
other words, the various possible positions of the screening units represent the
alternative courses of action that are available to the operational commander
when ordering the screen... [Ref. 10:p. 192]
My intention is to broaden the above notion of placement here in this thesis:
namely, that the operational commander can manipulate his tactical knowledge of
available ASW assets and pertinent environmental conditions and translate it into the
postulated zone method adopted in this model. That is, real ASW assets' capabilities
are describable, consistent and available for placement such that their composite
coverage can be described with approximate accuracy by an enclosed isotropic planar
region.
For the sake of simplicity, having no data to indicate otherwise, I assumed from
the start that errors involving communications, sensor, or weapon system's accuracy
could be statistically uniformly distributed within user-defined ranges. Lifetimes were
also to be represented by negative exponential distributions with user-defined means.
In this thesis model of the ASW screening scenario, the environment is sterile
and there is no interaction of the players with the environment.
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This thesis is UNCLASSIFIED. No attempt was made to interview U.S. Navy
personnel to substantiate the need for this study or to describe the behavior of the
real system. All information used in the formulation of the problem and the design
of the simulation model was obtained soley from the unclassifed references listed at
the end of this report.
B. MODEL SCENARIO
1. Carrier's Goals
The scenario posed is of a carrier battlegroup (referred to hereafter as
simply, carrier) transiting the open ocean to a specific destination within a specified
time constraint. It must arrive on time. This time constraint is referred to here as
Speed on Average (SOA). This is the carrier's only mission. The carrier is lethally
opposed by a force of high quality enemy submarines whose mission is
straightforward: attack, attack, and attack. The opposition is modelled after Soviet
platforms due to the EXPORT POTENTIAL of their state-of-the-art weapons
technology. This model should not be considered a detection model, but rather, is
better characterized as a constrained engagement model.
2. Model World
The world is represented by a rectangular Cartesian plane. The carrier's
motion is considered always to the right or up throughout the algorithmic schemes
in this model. It starts in the lower left corner and heads in a variable manner
towards the upper right hand corner. Figure 2 below provides a conceptualization































Figure 2. The Model World and Players
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3. Players
The U.S. complement of players also includes two types of reconnaissance
platforms: a fixed-wing Air ASW platform and a low-earth orbiting satellite. These
reconnaissance platforms are for detection of the opposition only.
The enemy is composed of four types of submarines (Oscar, Akula, Sierra,
and Kilo), a fixed-wing long range aircraft and a low-earth orbiting satellite. The
reconnaissance platforms are for detection of the opposition only. The submarines
are armed with missiles and torpedoes. These weapons are carried on the
submarines. There is a total of five weapon types. There are three types of missiles:
a Sea Launched Cruise Missle; a turbojet-driven projectile similar to a Harpoon; and,
a missile-boosted torpedo commonly referred to as an ASW Stand Off Weapon.
There are two types of torpedoes: a standard size 533 mm diameter equivalent to the
U.S. Navy 21 inch diameter MK-48's; and a large size 650 mm diameter for which
there is no U.S. equivalent.
4. Carrier Self-Defense Construct
A key idea in this model is that of the carrier's polygons of influence, which
are both offensive and defensive. This simplifying method was employed to manage
the carrier's many ASW and AAW resources and their complex independent
extensions by translating them into areas of simple, specific functionality. These areas
are referred to as Zones one through five, each with its own unique features. These
are described below.
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The carrier forms the intersection of twelve radii, each separated by an angle
of 30 degrees. There are five sets of colinear radii (of possible varying length) each
labeled one through twelve. These are arranged precisely like a standard clock face
starting with number twelve assigned the same slope as the carrier's course. This
orientation is constant about the carrier's slope. Each set defines a unique isotropic
zone of weapon system capability. The zones are numbered one through five, from
inside to outside. Zone 1, then, is the carrier itself; Zone 2 represents that area
covered by the carrier's AAW guns; Zone 3 is that area covered by surface-to-air
missiles; Zone 4 is that area that represents the ASW screen; and, Zone 5 is that
area which is controlled by the carrier's aircraft.
Figure 3 below represents the model's implementation of the bent-line U.S.
Navy ASW screen; that is, a forward looking one similar to that shown in Figure 1
Chapter II.
15
Figure 3. An Example Carrier Zone 4 (ASW)
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The following pages intentionally and simply display a sequence of Figures
4 through 10 which illustrate the basic concepts and relations in this scenario. These
same figures are repeated in Chapter V and accompanied there with a detailed
discussion. This sequential presentation is meant to help the reader visualize the




























Figure 5. A Depiction of Mobility
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Figure 6. An Illustration of a Detection
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to
Figure 7. An Illustration of a Penetration
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collocation: carrier (X,Y) = object(X,Y)
collinearity with carrier's slope:
ob j ect
carrier distance < zone radius
collinear with other radius or between two radii:
step 1:













divide by 30° to determine radius or radii of
interest
step 3 :





Figure 8. Within-zone Penetration Considerations
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Figure 10. Submarine Attack-Weapon Launch
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5. States of Knowledge
New information concerning the opposition's order of battle, for each side
respectively, is the essential condition which causes significant activity to occur in the
model. New information comes about in the form of a detection of the opposition.
Two types of detections, acoustic and electro-magnetic, are possible. A Monte Carlo
approach is used to decide if a detection should occur given the fact that the
detection range criteria has been met. This simulates the randomness associated with
environmental conditons, skill of the crew, functioning of equipment, etc.
The carrier's zone structure simplifies the examination of the placement of
the carrier's many ASW assets by allowing the study to focus on the essential
characteristic of zone shape. (A discussion of the potential impact on the simulation
analysis validity as a result of modelling abstractions made in this study is given in
Chapter VI.) The modelled zones represent only those capabilities contained within
the carrier battlegroup. Thus, initial detections of potentially hostile foreign objects
are usually accomplished via assets outside of the carrier battlegroup. The carrier's
activity against a penetrating object is usually cued by these outside assets. The
carrier relies on outside information to be relayed to it via the reconnaissance
aircraft or satellites. If any player on a given side makes a detection, that information
is broadcast to a network scoreboard of all players on that respective side. The
submarines themselves along with their air and space assets can make detections of
the carrier. The same broadcast method applies to their operation.
24
6. Carrier Movement
The movement of the carrier is described below (refer to Figure 9 above).
Upon receipt of new information concerning the opposition, the carrier's remaining
area of possible movement is overlayed with a rectangular grid. The nodes of this
grid are assigned a weight. This weight corresponds to the sum of weights
representing the weapon capabilities of those weapons able to reach that node at the
precise future time the carrier could traverse that node. This, from the carriers
current position and at the carriers current speed. The carrier selects a course which
minimizes the sum of the node weights. The carrier's chosen course is referred to as
a Plan of Intended Movement (PIM).
7. Submarine Movement
The submarines, upon receipt of new information, are given courses and
speeds which intercept the carrier based on that side's knowledge of the carrier's
latest reported PIM. The submarines' on-board weapons loads are factored into this
plan of attack calculation and all launch points and times are set.
8. Reconnaissance Movement
Only the carrier and submarines respond or react to new information by
changes in course and speed. Aircraft have been given a user-defined PIM and they
expire at its conclusion. Satellites continually appear in the area and then disappear
to reappear at regular intervals to mimic low-earth type orbits. Satellites have a full-
scenario-long lifespan.
25
9. Order of Battle
There is only one carrier. Each side has the maximum of five aircraft and
satellites each. There is a maximum of ten submarines: two OSCAR's; two
AKULA's; two SIERRA's; and four KILO's.
Each submarine can carry each of the five type of weapons. ALL
submarines are programmed to attack immediately and with their maximum range
weapon. They do this successively and relentlessly. If magazines are depleted, each
is programmed to approach the carrier to occupy its attention to simulate a
cooperative engagement where assigned players draw the risk of fire in order to
optimize the chances of success of a coordinated attack by non-targeted forces. Their
are no provisions for an underway replenishment of the submarine weapons stores.
A provision for a weapon reliability error is included along with the capacity for a
multiple weapon launch from a single submarine.
10. Carrier Self Defense Operation
Enemy submarines, aircraft, and weapons get absorbed by the carrier
polygons of influence simulating the action of individual Battlegroup assets. If
detected by the carrier's assets, a Monte Carlo technique is employed to determine
if the penetrating entity may pass undamaged through a Zone. If this does not yield
safe passage, a random draw is taken from an exponential distribution with a
weapon-specific mean; a lifespan is then assigned to the inbound object.
The ability of the carrier to defeat the given inbound object is treated as a
function of two independent states. These can be seen as the carrier's attention span
26
or saturation quotient, and the carrier's readiness state due to battle damage. A
user-defined cumulative distribution function is assigned to represent the required
associated probabilties for each of these states.
11. Scenario Summary
In summary, the model was specfied so as to focus on the ASW screening
problem. As an engagement model, it is simplistic. The submarine is the only
platform which fires weapons. There are no surface ships. There are no aircraft with
weapons. Only two classes of objects, the carrier and submarines, react to each other.
The carrier seeks to evade the submarines and the submarines single-mindedly seek
to engage the carrier. Every decision rule for player behavior is aimed at saturating
the carrier with maximum activity and distraction. This was done to determine the
significance of the ASW screen shape in an experimentally efficient manner and to




The approach taken in formulating and executing this model was focused on
the notion that the critical junctures in the unfolding of the scenario of the carrier
crossing the open seas could be captured in discrete moments in time. This way of
visualizing the sequence of actions requires many simplifications of the real world.
Other concepts that require simplification concern the many subtlties and
variances in the environment, in the operation of equipment and machines, and in
the human interaction with both. Errors involving communications, sensor, or
weapon system's accuracy were assumed to be uniformly distributed within
user-defined ranges. Lifetimes were assumed to be represented by negative
exponential distributions with user-defined means.
The method used for the latter is the randomization process called the Monte
Carlo method. This is a well known technique that employs a uniform probability
distribution, U(0,1), and a sufficient number of replications to reliably estimate
critical values for problems that are typically analytically intractable.
It is used here in the determination of a detection, a penetration, a survival of
a penetration, a successful weapon's launch, and the carrier's ability to defeat an
incoming weapon or hostile submarine or aircraft. A correct value for probabilities
associated with this method underpins the validity of any analysis of a serious, real
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nature. This study never intended to use real data. This study PURPOSEFULLY
contains no real data on the performance envelope's of any objects and
correspondingly all probabilties that would have been used were merely assumed
plausible.
The time between events is taken to be somewhat uninteresting in this scenario.
This is not too unlike the real world where steaming underway to a destination is
routine and not marked by any critical events so long as one's information about the
world remains unchanged.
Carriers certainly are engaged in many concurrent, vital and complex activities
underway but, for this study, the essential activity is dealing with a life-or-death
threat posed by an enemy submarine. In order for either side to effectively move
about they need too see where they are going and who or what of interest is in the
way. The carrier must critically rely on outside assets for information on pending
threats. This dependence in the model does indeed mimic the real situation to the
extent that the battlegroup's own organic assets rarely make uncued detections of
submarines. They need some starting information from national surveillance assets.
All other players' actions and exchanges have been assumed away for the
purposes of concentrating the study on the minimum components of movement,
detecting the opposition, attacking the carrier, and defending against attack. This
effectively synopsizes the real world ASW situation in a war.
Events are the critical junctures in the real world. The very name implies
something significant. Events have the same meaning in this model. Based on a
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change in the state of something defined to be of interest in the scenario, either the
carrier or a submarine choses to react and change its activity. Events imply decision.
An effort was made to keep events relatively pure; free from anything not strictly
policy related. Therefore, it was determined that the bulk of calculations necessary
to the model's operation would be executed elsewhere. In other words, separate
routines do the more intensive calculations.
Throughout Chapter V references to SIMSCRIPT II.5 coding conventions will
be done in a stylized fashion. Discrete event simulation receives some brief
comments. Events and Routines are described in an algorithmic manner.
1. Scheduling Events
SIMSCRIPT II.5 offers both an Event and a Process approach simulation
environment. The central issues which guide a decision between the two alternatives
are the nature of the activities in the real system and the sequenced execution of
those activities in simulated time. An event is seen as an instantaneous change of
state of the system. A process is a group of related events that are separated in time
and therefore a process consumes time. An event-driven approach was chosen for
this study due to its conceptual simplicity.
The following provides a fundamental explanation of this type of an
approach:
...Discrete event simulation concerns the modelling of a system as it evolves
over time by a representation in which the state variables change only at a
countable number of points in time. These points in time are the ones at which
an event occurs, where an event is defined to be an instantaneous occurrence
which may change the state of the system...Historically, two principal
approaches have been suggested for advancing the simulation clock, namely,
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next-event time advance and fixed-increment time advance...With the next-event
time advance approach, the simulation clock is initialized to zero and the times
of occurence of future events determined. The simulation clock is then
advanced to the time of occurence of the most imminent (first) of these future
events, at which point the state of the system is updated to account for the fact
that an event has occured and our knowledge of the times of occurence of
future events is also updated. Then the simulation clock is advanced to the
time of the (new) most imminent event, the state of the system is updated, and
future event times are determined, etc. This process of advancing the
simulation clock from one event time to another is continued until eventually
some prescribed stopping condition is satisfied...for a discrete-event simulation
model, periods of inactivity in a system are skipped over by jumping the clock
from event time to event time. ..It should be noted that the successive jumps of
the simulation clock are generally variable (unequal) in size....[Ref. 13:p. 5]
The majority of the work conducted behind the scenes in this simulation
model's execution was housed in the routines which calculated the next most
imminent events.
2. Unscheduling Events
Absolutely critical to the design philosophy of this model, is the fact that
certain state changes will definitely invalidate the conditions which predicated the
scheduling of some future events. All future events are kept on the event calendar.
Therefore, it was required to construct methods to unschedule particular classes of
events (remove them from the event calendar) in order to proceed to calculate a new
next most imminent event based on the new state.
B. MODEL STRUCTURE
The reader should note that there is not intended to be a one-to-one
correspondence here between the Subsection titles used for events and routines and
the actual names or groupings used in the SIMSCRIPT II.5 program code. The
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names used here are meant to be self-explanatory and are not as cryptic as those
found in the program code. This was done to enhance the flow of the discussion.
A basic design decision was made to handle the bulk of the calculations
necessary to the operation of the model outside of the events. It seemed sound
software engineering practice to keep the events free of any non-state-related
information. In other words, a routine should do calculations and the proper
function an event was to make essential system decisions based on the results of
those calculations.
Therefore, an examination of the list of events reveals the author's analysis of
those state changes which were pivotal to the operation of the system being studied.
Inspection of the list of routines shows those mathematical operations which
represent the essential physical activities of the players in the simulation.
1. Events
The information about the behavior of the real participants in the scenario
under study is what is modellled in an event. In the strictest sense, no decisions are
made in the running of the program. Every action is a result of the analysts' prior
decisions. Keeping this in mind, the discussion will continue to speak as if the players
were real entities playing out their roles.
Events are where the significant behavior of the system occurs. In the
following sections, a description of the state and the information which is weighed
in the choice of alternatives for each player is provided. Each section begins with
a Table which shows on the left, the variable names used to convey critical
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information to an event and, on the right, whether this information is stored in a
global variable or an entity attribute; with the entity attribute listed. For the most
part, only information as to the identity of the players is imported into applicable
events. This allows other pertinent information to be indexed and accessed through
entity attributes and specific arrays.
a. Course & Speed Changes
Table 1 Course and Speed Changes
every CVWAYPT
has a CV_WPT_FROM_TIME Global Variable
and a CVWPTFROMPLACE Global Variable
every LS_WAY_PT
has a LSWPTHULLNO LS.HULL.NO
every RCWAYPT
has a RC WPT HULLNO RC.HULL.NO
Immediately upon entry into any event the EVALUATE Routine is called
in order to update all player positions.
All objects in motion except satellites and inbound weapons eventually
change their direction. In addition, submarines and the carrier change their speeds
too. If either side does not receive any new information on the opposition, and
enough simulation time has elapsed, a WAY_PT event occurs. One is always
scheduled for every object except an inbound weapon. A launched weapon in this
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simulation goes in a straight line towards the fix the submarine predicts. Satellites are
constrained to cross the game board at an approximate 60 degree angle to the x-axis
at equidistant horizontal spacings.
A check is made in WAY-PT for any opposition players that may be
tracking the subject platform about to change direction and/or speed. If any opposing
player is in contact with the subject platform, then several of the future events
scheduled for those tracking players need to be unscheduled and new sets
rescheduled based on the subject platform's change in state.
A check is also made in this event for any opposition players that may be
scheduled to penetrate a carrier zone. Only in the instance that this event is focused
on the carrier will any penetrations be unscheduled. The carrier zones are sort of
AMOEBA-LIKE MASSES absorbing everything in their path. The carrier is
surrounded by five overlapping zones which act as defensive and offensive
mechanisms simultaneously. These zones travel with the carrier and maintain their
orientation. The absorption capability of a given zone is a function of the number of
simultaneous targets it must track (attention span) and its readiness (battle damage).
Attention span is a scarce but renewable resource. When the carrier changes course,
the predicted placement of these zones is likely to be invalidated. This future
location of a zone is necessary to predict future zone entries. If a PENETRATION
is scheduled for a submarine, it may need to be unscheduled if the carrier changes
course and/or speed in order to preserve overall scenario validity. However, an
opposing aircraft whose PIM is non-adapting may incur an attention span cost due
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to a scheduled PENETRATION occurring, when in fact, even though a zone would
no longer be penetrated, one should not. This is like knowing a threat is out there
lurking but having no idea where. This type of concern over pending threats
justifiably consumes attention span in the real world.
It is important to note that in the case of a released weapon, a
penetration is never unscheduled. This allows for two possibilities. One where a
penetration occurs when in fact one should not. And two, a zone entry may occur
with the possibility of going unnoticed, and thus, unpenalized. This is explained by
the fact that weapons in this simulation once aimed are never recalled nor their
tracking adjusted mid-course. The cost to attention span is justified by the fact that
any detected inbound weapon, on course or not, reasonably consumes attention span.
The next case is where a carrier change in course causes an inbound weapon to leak
through. Here, it would previously have passed the carrier's zones by but now will
not. The author views this as a justifible consequence or penalty due to an
unfortunate placement of appropriate carrier battlegroup assets. This treatment is a
positive bias towards the disastrous effects of surprise due to poor scouting. That is,
the author is favoring his very thesis, that lack of proper ASW screening can have
disastrous consequences.
b. Detection of Opposition
This event is central to the operation of the scenario. It is THE
CONDITION from which new information develops. The NEXT DETECTION
routines schedule this event to occur at precisely that instant in time when the Seeing
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Table 2. Detection of Opposition
EVENT ATTRIBUTES ENTITY ATTRIBUTES
every CV DETECTION
has a CV DET MODE






has a LS DET MODE
and a LS DET SEER HULLNO




platform is within range of the Seen platform. An acoustic detection usually takes
place at significantly shorter ranges than an electromagnetic detection. Type of
detection is referred to as MODE of detection in the simulation. MODE information
is passed to the event along with the identity of the SEER and the SEEN. Next,
user-defined values are input to a uniform probability distribution function whose
output is assigned as a time period required before this detection information may
be used by a given team. This serves as a proxy for errors in the sensing equipment
or in the communication networks of the particular detecting side. Given this lagged
time, a BROADCAST event is scheduled. A broadcast will NOT take place until
some time in the future. The message it conveys is only approximately true for
current simulation time. This makes each side's information inaccurate by
construction. The limits of this inaccuracy are strongly influenced by the lag time
limits which is preset by the user.
36
c. Broadcast to Network
Table 3 Broadcast to Network
EVENT ATTRIBUTES ENTITY ATTRIBUTES
every CV INFO TO LS
has a CV BRD TIME SEEN CV.SCBD.TIME
and a CV BRD X CV.SCBD.X
and a CV BRD Y CV.SCBD.Y
and a CV BRD COURSE CV.SCBD.SLOPE
and a CVBRDSPEED CV.SCBD.SPEED
every LS INFO TO CV
has a LS BRD TIME SEEN LS.SCBD.TIME
and a LS BRD HULLNO LS.HULL.NO
and a LS BRD X LS.SCBD.X
and a LS BRD Y LS.SCBD.Y
and a LS BRD COURSE LS.SCBD.SLOPE
and a LS BRD SPEED LS.SCBD.SPEED
What makes BROADCAST interesting is that it effects significant changes
in the states of the simulation. A wealth of event unscheduling/scheduling can occur
prompted by this event. Information is finally made available to the objects
themselves as well as to their team members. The TIME of the sighting, the identity
of the SEEN, its POSITION, COURSE, and SPEED are all there for inspection.
These are posted on that team's scoreboard, if the information is more recent (TIME
of original detection is later in simulation time) than that which is posted. Given this
system, it is possible that stale yet more accurate information may be discarded in
preference for information with a fresher time tag. Thus, if the arriving information
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passes a newness test, then action is taken to unschedule existing applicable events
and appropriate routines are invoked to calculate the next most imminent events.
d. Contact Loss on Opposition
Table 4 Contact Loss on Opposition
EVENT ATTRIBUTES ENTITY ATTRIBUTES
every CV LOSE CONTACT
has aCV LCT MODE Global Variable
and aCV LCT SEER CLASS CV.CLASS
and aCV LCT SEER HULLNO CV.HULL.NO
every LS LOSE CONTACT
has aLS LCT MODE Global Variable
and aLS LCT SEER HULLNO rc.hull.no
and aLS LCT SEEN HULLNO ls.hull.no
This event is simple in that it resets a seen flag which says that the
particular player in question has now moved out of detection range. This fact,
however, is nontrivial when routines are invoked for the carrier's movement. The
carrier's movement is focused on a path of minimum danger. The algorithm only
counts those submarines which have their SEEN flag set. More specifically, if no
platform on a given side has contact on an opposing player, then that opposing player
can maneuver unhindered until such time as it is re-acquired by the opposition.
Therefore, the loss of contact may give an opponent significant tactical advantage.
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e. Penetration of Carrier Zone
Table 5 Penetration of Carrier Zone
EVENT ATTRIBUTES ENTITY ATTRIBUTES
every LS PENETRATION










has a IW PEN CLASS
and a IW PEN HULLNO




In keeping with the design goal that events remain relatively pure policy
mechanisms, the event PENETRATION itself merely adds a weight for the
penetrating entity to account for the additonal consumption of the carrier's attention
span. The event PENETRATION calls a routine known as SURVIVAL.
SURVIVAL uses the information on the carrier's attention span and its battle
damage (readiness) state as an input to a Monte Carlo routine which decides if the
penetrating object is defeated for a particular zone.
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If a submarine penetrates Zone 1, the carrier itself, it is considered an
immediate stopping condition. The game is ended and summary statistics and data
generated and, if programmed, the next replication is initialized and run.
f. Submarine Weapon Launch








This event executes the command to launch a submarine's current
maximum range weapon. A Monte Carlo technique is used given a user-defined value
to test for any potential reliability problem with the weapon. This weapon is targeted
at a position in future time. Namely, the carrier's course is extrapolated a distance
compiled by applying its current speed to the time it takes the weapon to travel a
percentage of its maximum range. This projection uses the carrier scoreboard
position and course and speed to find this targeting solution or intersection. This
scoreboard position varies from the actual carrier position due to the aforementioned
constructed inaccuracy and randomness of platform and detection node time lags.
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g. Removal of Opposition Object
Table 7 Removal of Oppostion Object
EVENT ATTRIBUTES ENTITY ATTRIBUTES
every LS REMOVE
has a LS REM HULLNO LS.HULL.NO
and a LSREMFROMTIME Global Variables
every RC REMOVE
has a RC REM HULLNO RC.HULL.NO
and a RC REM FROM TIME Global Variables
and a RC REM FROM PLACE Global Variables
and a RCREMFROMZONE Global Variables
every IW REMOVE
has a IW REM CLASS IW.CLASS
and a IW REM HULLNO IW.HULL.NO
and a IW REM FROM TIME Global Variables
and a IW REM FROM PLACE Global Variables
and a IW REM FROM ZONE Global Variables
REMOVAL is an event which pertains to objects other than the carrier.
A removal is the result of a lifespan expiration. This may occur due to an
unsuccessful penetration of a carrier zone or from a user-defined time limitation.
If a submarine, or an opposition aircraft, penetrates a Zone other than 1,
and a removal is determined, the action taken is twofold. First, the carrier's attention
span is replenished by the amount previously consumed by the object's presence.
Second, the object's in-play flag is set to zero and it is subsequently ignored for the
41
rest of the replication. (NOTE: The carrier's inventory of readiness is non
replenishable. Battle damage or readiness cannot increase since no provision is
made for underway repairs. Zeroing out of this quantity is a simulation stopping
condition.
The removal of an inbound weapon is similar. In addition, the proximity
of the weapon's hit position to that of the carrier is calculated. The reader is
reminded that the weapon was aimed at a predicted carrier position based on a
scoreboard estimated position with the potential of being significantly different than
the carrier's actual position. This distance is then compared with that of the
particular weapon's lethal radius for either a direct or near hit. If either such
condition is met, the carrier's battle damage state is adjusted. Battle damage cannot
be repaired or replenished during a given simulation replication. If the capacity of
the carrier to sustain weapons hits is totally exhausted, a stopping condition is met.
The replication is ended and summary statistics and data generated, and, if
programmed, the next replication is initialized and run.
h. Arrival of Reconnaissance
Table 8 Arrival of Reconnaissance
EVENT ATTRIBUTES ENTITY ATTRIBUTES
every RC START
has a RCRCSHULLNO RC.HULL.NO
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Reconnaissance vehicles, aircraft and satellites, enter the game board in
this event. Satellites have regular orbits. They cycle on in this event and they cycle
off in the WAY_PY event. These vehicles arrive at preset user-defined times. They
also have a preset user-defined PIM. They have user-defined starting positions.
Aircraft starting positions may also be determined by providing user-defined inputs
to a uniform distribution function whose output is the desired position. A provision
is also made for aircraft starting positions to correlate with an object on the same
team.
i. Carrier Replenishment






In order to launch aircraft or to periodically take on a replenishment of
supplies, the carrier MUST slow to a speed of approximately five to seven knots. This
particular event sets the carrier's speed to its minimum value for a specified time
period. It schedules itself at regular intervals. Both the duration and frequency of this
period are user-defined.
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j. Carrier Arrival at Destination






This event is called CV_SOA and signals the SUCCESSFUL arrival of
the carrier to its user-defined destination. This implies: timeliness; that no
submarines have penetrated to Zone 1; and, that insufficient battle damage was
incurred to have stopped the replication hereto. The replication is here ended and
summary statistics and data generated, and, if programmed, the next replication is
initialized and run.
2. Routines
The purpose of a routine in this model is to be an engine of calculation. All
activity is interrelated through mathematical expressions. Values for speed, course,
detection range, zone shape and extension, probabilties associated with detection,
penetration, survival of a penetration and weapon's launch, and the carrier's ability
to defeat an incoming weapon or hostile submarine or aircraft, all fuel this engine.
The primary output of each major routine is the value TIME. Time is the mechanism
by which the scenario advances from one interesting state to another. Due to the
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architecture of constancy of values for all attributes and parameters between events,
and the nature of linear motion, a specific value for time implies the ability to project
specific future positions for all objects in the scenario. Therefore, the determination
of the next most imminent event is, in this implementation, reliable by construction.
The presentation of algorithmic notions and their subsequent formulation
and solution as equations is presented in the ensuing discussion. Only initial
formulations and their final derivations will be shown. Discussion of mechanical
details will be generally avoided. The mathematical sophistication of any method
does not exceed that of elementary algebra and plane trigonometry.
a. Movement
Entities are treated as point masses with constant speeds and linear
courses. Changes in courses and speeds occur instantaneously. This ignores the
concept of inertia and thus allows objects to go from a stopped position to a constant
velocity in no time. It also allows for immediate and abrupt reversals in course. The
model world is a standard Cartesian plane with all of the attendant conventions this
implies. Upon every occurance of an event the positions of each player are updated
by the EVALUATE routine. Equation Set 1 provided below illustrates the method
of updating each in-play object's X and Y coordinates. The time increment since the
last evaluation is recorded and updated at each instance of this routine's execution
as it is essential to this operation.
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Xt = X r + (speed x cos (arctan (slope) )
)
x (tr-t )
*t = y r + (speed x sin (arctan( slope) ) x (tx -"to)
where:
to = time of last evaluation
ti = current time
X = X-axis coordinate
Y = Y-axis coordinate
Equation Set 1. X and Y Coordinates Update
The repetitive operations such as calculating an object's course, the
distance between two objects, and movement of the endpoints (X and Y positions)
of the carrier radii were facilitated by writing standardized Functions. Equation Sets












to = time of last evaluation
ti = current time
X = X-axis coordinate
Y = Y-axis coordinate
Equation Set 2. Slope Function
The Slope Function contains checks against errors introduced from division
by zero either within this routine or for other operations which use the output of this
routine. The repeat of Figure 4 below shows the effect of these checks as constraints
on the legal ranges of values for platform courses. Shaded regions are where slopes
are between [100,-100] around the y-axis and between [.01, -.01] around the x-axis.
A slope of 100 or -100 was arbitrarily chosen as sufficiently vertical for this model
and avoids this discontinuity of the tanget function. A slope of .01 was arbitrarily
chosen for a horizontal slope to awoid division be zero in some instances. These
values yeild the odd degrees shown blow in Figure 4. These shaded regions (not
drawn to scale) are gaps only in the sense that they limit the direction an object may
take from its present position. This does NOT imply that gaps exist in the model
world itself. Since the carrier's course is always up and to the right and there is no
strictly vertical or horizontal movement, problems with certain trigonometric

















Figure 4. Legal Courses for All Platforms
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The Distance Function employs the Pythagorean Theorem. Distance here
is usually the length of the hypoteneuse which is equal to the square root of the sum
of the square of the lengths of the two remaining sides. These lengths are coveniently
the differences in magnitude of each object's X and Y coordinates respectively.











Xi.Y, = position of object #1
X2,Y 2 = position of object #2
Equation Set 3. Distance Function
The Radii Endpoint Movement Function was constructed specifically to
suit the SIMSCRIPT II.5 trigonometric function implementation scheme. It is trivial.
Equation Set 4 is included below for completeness.
input = (arctan (carrier slope) - radius angle to carrier slope)
radians
where:
input is used for cosine and sine functions in Equation Set 1.
Equation Set 4. Radii Endpoint Movement Function
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Directionality is a function of both the sign of an object's speed and its
slope. A positive speed always means motion is to the right, and, conversely, a
negative speed means motion is to the left. Motion up ( + ) or down (-) is determined
by the sign of the product of the speed and slope. The repeat of Figure 5 below
depicts this.
_ slope + slope
speed + speed
+ slope x slope
speed + speed
Figure 5. A Depiction of Mobility
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b. Next Detection
The routine Next Detection determines which object on the game board
will next produce a detection of some object on the opposing side. It determines the
DETECTOR, the DETECTEE, and the TIME of the detection. Since a given
detection may ultimately alter the course or speed of some object only the very next
detection is sought and scheduled by the routine. This minimizes the number of
events which may need to be unscheduled.
This routine is pivotal. Both the carrier and the submarine desire to know
of each other's whereabouts. The carrier would prefer to avoid the submarines. The
submarines desire to approach the carrier to within range of their weapons. The
reconnaissance aircraft and satellites sole function is to search and report any
information on the enemy.
An object's constant speed and direction project its location in a straight
line into future simulation time. Location is one of the primary variables in the
scenario under study. Information on the opposition is mainly about their location.
Given that direction and speed are constant between events, the calculation of points
in future time is straightforward. The repeat of Figure 6 is provided to visualize a
typical orientation of players expected to precede a detection.
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Figure 6. An Illustration of a Detection
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Quadratic expressions are employed to solve for the required time of
intersection of the DETECTEE object and the DETECTOR'S circular envelope of
sight (range, is in effect, the radius of a circle centered on the detecting object).
Equation Set 5 is given below to demonstrate the algebraic interpretation of the
notion of a next detection shown in Figure 6.
Solving for required time, the discriminant was tested for a positive value
and the resulting roots were examined for applicabilty. A discriminant having the
value of zero was determined to be a tangential situation where a DETECTION and
a LOSS OF CONTACT occurred simultaneously and was therefore declared
uninteresting.
Given two real roots, several types of situations could be pending. In the
case where they both equal zero, it was determined that both objects must occupy the
same position and have the same course and speed. This is not prohibited but is
considered a degenerate case. Another degenerate case arises when both the roots
are negative. This is explained as those points in past simulation time when a
detection would have occured along with its complementary loss of contact. A
combination of a positive root and a negative root determine that a detection has
already occured and that a loss of contact has yet to occur. Two positive roots imply
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to find: a time t in the future such that two objects, A and B, will be separated
by an exact detect distance r.
Future positions:
XA = XA + [cos (arctan (slopeA ) x (speedA )] x t
YA = YA + [sin (arctan ( si opeA ) x (speedA )] x t
XB = XB + [cos (arctan (slopeB ) x (speedB )] x t
YB = XB + [sin (arctan (slopeB ) x (speedB )] x t
each of the above bracketed expressions is assigned the variable names
a
, P , y ' & . respectively, for ease of discussion
detect distance r:
r = v/UAt " V 2 + (Y* C ~ V
A generalized Quadratic expression was derived for t, using the standard
coefficients Q, R, and S.
Qt 2 + Rt 2 + S=0




Q = [(cc-y) 2 + (p-6) 2 ]
R = 2 [(a-Y) (XAo-XBo ) - (S-6) (^-F^)]
S = [XA _ - XR } 2 + [YA - YR ) 2 -I 2
Equation Set 5. Next Detection Algorithm.
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that both events have yet to occur. The minimum root is chosen to schedule the next
detection and the maximum root the next loss of contact.
A simplifying assumption made here was that in the time between a
DETECTION and a LOSS OF CONTACT, the various phases of ASW prosecution
known as localization, classification and tracking were occuring with complete
efficiency. No attempt was made to account for human-in-the-loop type of
interactions such as Recognition Differential or the fact that knowledge gained from
having tracked the opposition might introduce asymmetry in the conditions under
which contact would be lost; a detection arising from an unalerted state being
qualitatively different than the loss of a weak signal in an alerted state.
c. Next Penetration
The routine Next Penetration determines which object on the game board
will next pierce an applicable zone of the carrier. It examines each enemy aircraft,
detected submarine, and launched weapon. It determines which of these objects will
enter a zone the carrier has constructed to defeat it. The next PENETRATOR,
ZONE and TIME of the penetration are all calculated and a Penetration Event is
scheduled. At that time, an assesment of the carrier's attention span and battle
damage will be given to the routine Survival to determine if the incoming object may
continue.
The carrier is surrounded by five overlapping zones which act as defensive
and offensive mechanism's simultaneously. These zones travel with the carrier and
maintain their orientation. Many types of varied and irregular shapes are possible to
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construct since the radii length are user defined. The carrier may or may not be the
centroid of a given zone. Zero radii lengths may actually put the carrier on the
boundary of a given zone. The repeat of Figure 7 below is shown for further
clarification.
The Event PENETRATION occurs only if the carrier KNOWS that a
foreign object has come within one of its five zones. If a submarine is undetected,
then it may actually move into the carrier's polygon's of influence without any action
being taken. The only aircraft which cause zone action are the enemy's. All
weapons are considered detected along with the launching platform when a weapon
is released. Any entry of an object, detected or undetected, into Zone 1 causes that
object to be automatically terminated. If that object is a submarine, it is a stopping
condition for that particular replication.
56
Figure 7. An Illustration of a Penetration
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Penetrations can take place from within a zone as well as from without.
Starting positions, or a previously undetected submarine, can induce the condition
where an object suddenly appears already inside a zone. (This requires a different
treatment than that of predicting when a penetration is to occur. The situation to
be checked is whether or not an object, at the very beginning of its replication
lifespan, is detected and inside any given zone.)
A weapon only really comes into being once it is launched. Therefore, it
cannot be detected until this time. The repeat of Figure 8 is offered in conjunction
with Equation Set 6 to help depict the steps of the within-zone penetration
calculations.
This notion of an object's first appearance occuring already within a zone
is treated in some detail here. If a given object is not collocated with the carrier or
collinear with the carrier's slope, then it must lie on the line collinear with another
radius or lie between the extensions of a pair of radii. Tests for position as
collocation with the carrier involve the simple comparison of X and Y coordinates.
Tests for position with respect to objects in the direct path of the carrier are straight-
forward distance comparisons.
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collocation: carrier (X,Y) = object(X,Y)
collinearity with carrier's slope:
ob j ec
t
carrier distance < zone radius
collinear with other radius or between two radii
step 1 :












divide by 30° to determine radius or radii of
interes t
step 3 :





Figure 8. Within-Zone Penetration Considerations
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Tests for the object's bearing require several steps. This can occur at the
beginning of a given replication or at the beginning of object's lifespan. First, a
relative bearing to the carrier's course is determined using the carrier's position, the
position of an endpoint of radius twelve for an arbitrary non-zero Zone and the
position of the given object. These three points form a triangle. The Law of Cosines
is then invoked to find the relative bearing. The object's relative position with
respect to a given Zone (tested from inside out) is found using the point of
intersection of the carrier/object line and the radii endpoints line. The distance of
the object to the carrier is then compared to distance of the point of intersection to
the carrier since that point is either a zone vertex or on a zone boundary. Equation
Set 6 below shows the derivations used to determine this point of intersection.
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test for object location with respect to carrier
1. Collocation
2. Collinear with carrier's slope
3. on a given radius or between two radii
a. compute © using LAW OF COSINES
b. test relative location of object with respect to each zone
i. calculate point of intersection of line between carrier and
object and line between appropriate radii end points
ii. test if distance from object to carrier is less than or equal the
distance from this point to carrier.
Step 3. a. is illustrated in Figure 8 step 1.
Step 3.b.i. is illustrated in Figure 8 step 3 and described here:
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let a = —-—
-
let y = —-—- {known quantities)
x -xc x1-x2
Equation Set 6. From-Within Next Penetration
(continued on next page)
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•• yp = y x <v X,) * Yi











NOTE: (a-Y) cannot =
where
endpoint radii = (X^YJ and (X2,Y2)
carrier position = (X
C
,YC)
object position == (X ,Y )
point of intersection = (X^Y
p)
Eqijation Set 6. From-Within Next Penetration
The typical situation encountered here is the determination of that point
in future simulation time when the object's future location will intersect with an edge
or vertex of an applicable carrier polygon. Figure 7 illustrates the typical scenario
of a from-without penetration and Equation Set 7 below shows the applicable
calculations.
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The method used to predict a from-without PENETRATION Event
involves the calculation of that instant in future time when an object's position will
be collinear with any zone boundary. Expressions of the future positions of all radii
endpoints as well as that of each object in-play are manipulated using the vector
definition of a linear combination. A system of simultaneous equations is developed
and time of collinearity it is found.
to solve for time t of intersection of a point and a line:
{Xi ,Y1 ) = {Xi , Yi ) + (speedc x t x cos (4> c ) , speed c x t x sin (<t> c ) )
i = 1, 2 for any two adjacent radii endpoints.
[X. , Yn ) = U n , Yn ) + {speed., x t x cos (*_) , speed- x t x sin (* D ) )
when points 1, 2 and p are collinear:
a (X. , Y, ) + (1-a) (X2 , Y2 ) = (XD , Yp )
if a e [0,1] , the point p will lie between points 1 and 2 and a penetration
takes place on this barrier.





) +fc x (speedc x cos (<D C ) -speedp x cos (* p ) ) = X2 ^XPo
a x ( Yx -
Y
2 ) + 1 x ( speedc x cos ( * e ) - speedp x cos (© p ) ) = - Y2 o+ Yl g
aA + tB = C , t - [zJXtMi
rewrite as: aD + tE = F solve *
- {AE.DB)
Equation Set 7. From-Without Next Penetration
(Continued on next page)
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where:
1, 2 are subscripts denoting any two adjacent radii endpoints attributes.
$ arctan (absolute value of the slope) for c and p.
c subscript denotes carrier attributes.
p subscript denotes penetrating object attributes.
o subscript denotes current time.
t subscript denotes future time.
t variable is future time of interest.
Equation Set 7. From-Without Next Penetration
The usual checks for division by zero are made. Since the algorithm does
not distinguish between the time of entry or the time of exit, times are collected for
further manipulation. The minimum positive time is used and a PENETRATION
Event is scheduled (given the object's class and hull number and zone to be
penetrated). This procedure calculates and schedules only the next most imminent
PENETRATION Event for each object.
d. Penetration Survival
This routine effectively condenses the carrier battlegroup's many offensive
and defensive capabilities into the simple mechanism of absorption by a zone.
Shapes of zones are the focus of this study. The objective is for the carrier to
position its resources so as to maximize the time-in-zone for a given inbound threat.
Absorption of an object was considered to happen over time and NOT
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instantaneously. Absorption is both a function of the carrier's current attention span
consumption and its battle damage state.
User-defined probability density functions furnish the values used in the
Monte Carlo technique employed here. The conditions of attention span and battle
damage state were determined to be independent for this study. This allows the
simple multiplication of the probabilities associated with attention span (BSY PTS)
and battle damage (HT PTS). THe result is the test condition against which a
random draw is compared in a standard fashion.
Inbound weapons are assigned BSY PT and HT PT values derived from
their speed. That is, time-to-react till a platform enters Zone 1 is the criteria by
which an inbound weapon is assigned a cost. A faster, more distant weapon may have
a lower rating than a slower, nearer one. Available attention span is a function of the
number and type of simultaneous tracking and countering operations conducted by
the carrier. Attention span may be replenished as objects are removed from play
either by absorption or by expiration of pre-set lifespans.
If the Monte Carlo mechanism indicated an absorption was to occur, an
exponential distribution function was called given a mean lifetime per object per
zone. A plausible estimate of an average travel distance per inbound object per
zone, under favorable conditions for the carrier, was determined by the author. This
distance was then divided by the object's maximum speed and an average lifetime
yielded. At the end of this future time, the object was removed from the simulation
scenario.
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The success of an submarine's penetration may not only be seen as its
passing through a zone unpenalized but also in its launching of a weapon before it
is absorbed by a given zone.
e. Carrier Evasion PIM
This routine is called whenever the carrier obtains new information on the
disposition of any opposing submarines. The carrier wants to avoid the danger of
engaging the opposing submarines. The carrier's mission is to reach its destination
intact and on time.
The purpose of this routine is to determine a path which represents the
least exposure to known submarines' weapons. The first action taken is to
superimpose a rectangular grid on the carrier's remaining area of possible movement.
The repeat of Figure 9 is given below to visualize the process undertaken to establish
this shortest path.
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Figure 9. An Illustration of a Carrier Evasion PIM
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Equation Set 8 below contains no math notation since most component
algebraic operations have been discussed elsewhere. The carrier's current position
defines the lower left corner and the carrier's destination forms the upper right
corner of this grid. The X and Y distances are computed to establish equidistant
horizontal and vertical segments, respectively, between each node on this imaginary
grid. The nodes are named in a standard manner beginning with (0,0) in the lower
left corner and ending with (m,m) in the upper right corner. Possible paths for a PIM
are composed of either collinear or orthogonal adjacent segments.
to establish a carrier PIM with minimum danger
Step 1. Overlay rectangular grid
Step 2. Compute future carrier arrival times per each grid node.
Step 3. Determine all weapons within range of each node at appropriate
times computed in step 2; Assign a lethality value for each weapon
in range of all possible nodes per each value in set of carrier arrival
times; Sum set of values for all weapons in range for each node as
composite node weight.
Step 4. Sum all node weights for each of 252 possible paths; collect set with
minimum value.
Step 5. If members of minimum value set exceed one, then randomly select
a PIM from this set.
Equations Set 8. Carrier Evasion PIM Algorithm
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The carrier's projected arrival times at each of these nodes is computed.
These times are then used as an input for determining which of each type of
submarine weapons could be within range beginning with the maximum range
weapon currently in each submarine's inventory. These calculations use the carrier's
scoreboard knowledge on each detected submarine's HULL NO, COURSE and
SPEED. It was determined that the carrier would be given perfect knowledge of each
opposing submarine's current onboard weapons load or inventory. This default
condition was chosen since to try to describe the true nature of imperfect knowledge
seemed too arbitrary. A value equal to the direct hit value of each type of weapon
from every submarine within future range of each node was collected and summed
for each node. This total weight was a danger or lethality value associated with each
node. Each weapon was counted more than once. A weight was assigned to every
node it could reach for each computed value of a future carrier arrival time.
Dijkstra's algorithm for the shortest path on a network was used as a
means to solve for the required carrier PIM.
The carrier's orthogonal PIM segments are converted to near horizontal
or vertical courses to maintain consistency with the Slope Function. The imposition
of collinear or orthogonal course alternatives may, at first glance, appear to be too
restrictive a constraint on the carrier's PIM. However, since new arrivals of
information occur in any reasonable scenario, subsequent calls to this evasion
routine will continue to cause a new carrier PIM to be computed. The carrier's actual
historical track should not appear so artificial.
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f. Submarine Attack-Weapon Launch
This routine is called whenever the submarine obtains new information
on the disposition of the carrier. Each submarine wants to aggressively attack and
destroy the carrier. As a member of a team, the submarine will engage in sacrificial
actions for the accomplishment of the team mission despite the detriment to its own
safety. Submarines have been made to relentlessly pursue the carrier even though
they may not have any weapons in inventory or any hope of an attack solution given
current steady-state conditions. The tactical advantage gained can either be a more
accurate, third party fix or merely the consumption of the carrier's attention span
which increases the likelihood of anothers submarine's successful attack.
The purpose of this routine is to determine, for each given submarine, a
minimum point in future time at which that given submarine can acheive a firing
solution for its current maximum range weapon; and then, to schedule a Launch
Event.
The calculations are aimed at finding the first such LAUNCH Event for
each submarine. First, all submarines with positive value speeds are examined from
slow to maximum. If no LAUNCH Events are able to be scheduled this is referred
to as a no attack criteria condition. If no attack criteria is met in the first step,
negative speeds are next examined for each submarine to find a possible Launch
















Figure 10. Submarine Attack-Weapon Launch
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Quadratic expressions are used to solve for the required time of
intersection of the carrier and the submarine's fired weapon. Equation Set 9 below
shows the algebraic derivation and manipulation of the expression to find minimum
future time in which the submarine may launch an attack, this is scheduled as a
LAUNCH Event for each submarine.
to schedule a LAUNCH EVENT and a weapon REMOVE EVENT
NOTE 1: The reader should refer to Figure 11. Submarine Attack
Consideration





t = carrier travel time from present position to point (X,Y)
tj = time till submarine launches weapon
t2




a = arctan (carrier slope)





FF = (carrier speed) x cos (a
GG = sub speed
HH = Yc-Ys
II = (carrier speed) x sin (a)
t2 = weapon range/ weapon speed
Equation Set 9. Weapon's Launch Algorithm
(continued on next page)
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Step 1: to find \
x
using expressions for point (X,Y)
earlier cooord.ina.te submarine 1 & weapon
Xc + (FF x t) = X = Xs + (GG x cos (y) x t)
Yc + (II x t) = Y = Yg + (GG x sin(y) X t)
i . EE + (FFcosy = -==-—^-
(GG x
x t) HH + (II x t)
(GG x t)
NOTE 2 : (cosy) 2 + (siny) 2 = 1
a. Use NOTE 2 to form generalized equation of second degree
variable of interest
with t as
At2 + Bt +C = O
b. next substitute (x
l
+ t2 ) for t
c. expand and re-express generalized form.
NOTE 3: t
2






= (FF) 2 + (II) 2 -
= (2 x A x t 2 ) +
(GG) 2
(2 x EE x FF) + (2 x HH x JJ)
C = (2 x FF x FF x t2 ) + (2 x HH x II x t2 ) + • (EE)
2
+ (HH) 2




Equation Set 9. Weapon's Launch Algorithm
(continued on next page)
73
Step 2.
given t2 and having found lv compute t where tj + t2 = t
tlt is time of LAUNCH EVENT
t
,
is time of weapon hit target or (REMOVAL EVENT)
Step 3.
given t compute X,Y and then submarine course to X,Y using:
X = Xsub + (GG x cos(y)xt)
Y = Ysub + (GG x sin(Y)xt)
sub course = SLOPE (X
sub , Ysub , X,Y)
Equation Set 9. Weapon's Launch Algorithm
Solving for required time, the denominator of the solution expression for
the generalized equation of the second degree was tested for a non-zero value. A
degenerate case could occur using this algorithm where the variable "A" in step 1
might equal zero. This condition was eliminated by construction. The discriminant
was tested for a positive value and the resulting roots were examined.
Given two real roots, several types of situations could be pending. In the
case where they both equal zero, it was determined that both objects must occupy the
same position and have the same course and speed. This is not prohibited but is
considered a degenerate case. Another degenerate case arises when both the roots
are negative. This is explained as those points in past simulation time when launches
could have occured along the players present courses. A combination of a positive
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root and a negative root determine that a launch could have already occured and
that a second opportunity is about to occur. Two positive roots imply that both events
have yet to occur. The minimum of these is chosen to schedule the next Launch
Event.
The other root is ignored. By construction, all weapons are designated
to be launched as soon as a first launch per type is initiated. (That is, with individual
rates of simultaneous fire assigned per type and specific intervals between volleys set
for reloading weapons per type and submarine type.)
If no attack criteria can be found for a given submarine, then a course
and speed are assigned in the following arbitrary manner:
1. The distance between the submarine and the carrier is computed.
2. This distance is divided by the submarine's maximum speed to yield a time
increment.;
3. The point where the carrier would be at this time in the future is then
calculated.
4. This point is then assigned as the submarines destination and its course
computed.
The justification for this tactic is given by the fact that the weapons
carried by the submarine generally possess speeds far in excess of either the carrier
or the submarine. This fact, combined with the provision that a weapon is usually
fired at less than its maximum range, yields the option of a flank approach with a
wide window of launch-time should the carrier slow for replenishment or favorably
change course. These calculations are straightforward and are not shown here.
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g. Replication End & Summary Statistics
The discussion in this section covers those activities which entail listing
of summary values for any measures of effectiveness, releasing memory and emptying
the event calendar for the next replication, and, finally, the listing of values for all
player attributes. A full listing of all player attributes is given in Appendix A.
Appendix B provides input files which show which of these attributes are user-
defined.
A replication may end under several diverse conditions which are listed
below in their entirety:
1. Penetration of Zone 1 by a submarine.
2. Zeroing out of carrier's battle damage points.
3. Enroute at expiration of time alloted; SOA is not met.
4. Arrival of carrier to destination; SOA is met.
The reader should note that conditions one through three above contribute to the
sum of the number of trials which are considered FAILURES. Only condition four
contributes to the sum which represents SUCCESS.
Gameover is the first routine called whenever a stopping condition occurs.
It, in turn, calls Stats and Report. Gameover releases memory consumed by the
objects and their attributes. These are reinitailized at the beginning of each
replication. An algorithm is also executed which empties the event calendar of all
scheduled events in anticipation of beginning the next replication.
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Stats invokes a SIMSCRIPT II.5 system function which automatically lists
every attribute of each object in the simulation as of the current time. For those
entities previously removed, their attribute values as of the time of their removal
have remained stored. All values are output here to an external ASCII file.
Examples of this type of output are provided in Appendix C.
Report was specifically set aside to collect information on each
experiment's measures of effectiveness. A simple sum of the number of CV_WINS
and the number of CV_LOSES was chosen initially. Since this study never reached
maturity, these remain in this simplistic form.
C. CONCEPTUAL EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The ideas presented in this section are preliminary in nature but are included
in the discussion for the sake of completeness. SINCE THE FULL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MODEL WAS NEVER ACHIEVED, this portion
of the study was never refined. Here, an experiment is taken to mean the full set of
differing trials. A trial is composed of a number of replications where the input
values are all the same but different values drawn from probability distributions may
cause different results for a given replication.
1. Proposed Measures of Effectiveness
The design of this model was intended to provide a rich set of variables for
the analyst to manipulate. A model which specifically allows for manipulation of
many factors provides a framework for sensitivity analyses which might discover
unexpected relationships in the behavior of the system.
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An extremely simple measure of effectiveness(MOE) was adopted for
purposes of beginning this study. A point estimate of the probability of successful
transit was chosen, along with its complement, the probability of failure of the carrier
to reach its destination.
2. Proposed Experimental Design
The shape of the carrier's zones, as a proxy for the disposition of certain
types of battlegroup asset capabilties, is the primary concern for this investigation.
The null hypothesis for this experiment is that there is no significant difference in the
ASW screening doctrine chosen by the carrier on the outcome of the carrier's
likelihood of a successful open ocean transit. Hence, we would like to, at the end
of this proposed experiement, be able to claim that there exists a statistically
significant advantage, in terms of success rate, in reshaping screen doctrine. The
available statistical tools allow the investigator to analyze the results in terms of their
significance.
Given the above MOEs, a full factorial design was conceived. Factorial
design focuses on critical factors which are manifested by assuming only one of two
values; arbitrarily called high or low. Table 11 below shows a proposed design.
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- Each only knows what it discovers
- Carrier has prior knowledge of enemy
This study was intended to investigate the above factors:
ONE ASW Zone Shape;
TWO Weapon Mode;
THREE Weapon Type; and,
FOUR State of Prior Information.
Factor 1 is the HYPOTHESIZED variable of interest in this study. ONE
a) represents the current U. S. Navy ASW screening doctrine of the bent-screen,
narrow, forward-looking tactic. ONE b) represents a generalized look-in-all-
directions tactic.
Factor 2 was meant to reveal the significance that the combination of
missiles and torpedoes has, versus that of the torpedo alone, on the carrier's
probability of successful transit. TWO a) was set to a torpedo-only threat and used
to simulate the threat assumed in the limiting lines of approach doctrine (ONE a)).
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TWO b) was set to both missiles and torpedoes which simulates the author's opinion
of the real threat which demands the new coverage tactic (ONE b)).
Factor 3 was included to test for the significance of sophisticated weaponry
against weapons that were merely non-reactive projectiles.
Factor 4 is meant to key on the pivotal role of scouting information on the
outcome of a struggle to gain the decisive tactical advantage. In other words, if the
quality of information derived from strategic assets is such that it allows the carrier
a sufficient margin against the enemy, without a change in ASW screening doctrine,
then a National Defense policy might be suggested that focuses investment in
enhancing strategic surveillance capabilities instead of, or along with, pursuing a
better ASW screening doctrine.
This design is intended to show that there is indeed a problem with the
current ASW screening technique in that looking ahead too narrowly makes the
carrier vulnerable to a flank surprise attack. The significance of Factor 1 would have
been tested using standard Analysis Of Variance Techniques (ANOVA).
3. Proposed Statistical Considerations
A point estimate of the probability of successful transit was to be estimated
for each of the two sets of eight trials for this experiment. Analysis of variance was
to be used to test if screen shape does significantly affect the probability of successful
transit. If the shape factor should have proved to be significant, as a result of a
comparison of the results of these trials, then a fresh examination of U.S. Navy ASW
screening doctrine would seem appropriate.
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a. Analysis of Variance
The Analysis of Variance is used to see if the difference in the results of
experimental trials might be due to chance or experimental error. If these differences
cannot be explained in this manner, then a significance in the results can be
attributed to the values for the different applicable factors in the trials composing an
experiment. The number of replications per trial would have been set here to 100
and this figure is assumed in the remaining discussion.
There are three major assumptions in the analysis of variance:
1. Normality;
2. Homogeneity of Variance; and,
3. Independence of Errors.
Assumption number one would be met here since the total number of trials per
shape factor is large (100 replications x 8 trials = 800). Assumption number two
states that the variance within each trial or set of replications should be distributed
equally across all trials. This assumption is needed to combine, or pool, all
within-trial variances into a single within-experiment calculation. If unequal sample
sizes are allowed to exist then this would likely lead to unequal variances. This points
out the efficacy of the controlled nature of a simulation experiment which affords
one the ability to set the number of replications equal for all trials in an experiment.
The third assumption speaks to the difference of each point estimate( sample
estimate of the probability of successful transit) from its true value (population
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mean). The error for one observation should not be related to the error for any other
observation.
Prior to constructing an analysis of variance table, it is usually considered
prudent to test the distribution of the errors, or residuals, for normality. In addition,
one should perhaps plot [Ref. 14:p. 1] the relationship between the residuals and the
expected value of the response to see if there is any apparent correlation.
b. Common Random Numbers
Common Random Numbers can be used in the conduct of all trials in
order to reduce the variance associated with the point estimates yielded from the
analysis of the factor of interest; ASW Zone Shape. This means that the set of
observations (within-trial critical values) across each trial are constructed to be
correlated. The raw results of point estimates for the probability of success from
each set of trials, when compared by taking the difference of the two quantities,
yields a new quantity little value; its corresponding variance cannot be estimated.
As shown in Equation Set 10, a slight manipulation of the above
difference-in-sums quantity yields the sum-of-the-differences of each replication's
estimate for a given set of two trials. This sum is then divided like the first quantity
by the number of replications. The resulting statistic takes advantage of the fact that
the original point estimates were derived from the same set of random numbers. In
the formula for the variance for this statistic, a covariance term ends up being
subtracted from the sum of the variances of the original point estimates: this may in
fact reduce the variance of the statistic. This approach is addressed in the following:
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...It is a general belief and empirical observation, though not a proven
fact(Schmben and Margolin, 1978), that using identical input streams will
create positive correlation in the outputs... [Ref. ll:p. 216]
c. A Suggested Composite Estimate
The above statistical treatment of hypothetical results suggests the
need for a new composite statistic. This statistic would provide a test for any possible
incremental improvement provided by the high value for the ASW zone over the low.
Such a new composite estimate could be formulated as shown below in Equation Set
11: as a quadruple sum of the difference between every replication point estimate of
these two shape treatments, varied over the other three factors and divided by the
total number of replications (i.e. 800 as shown above).
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Pi = point estimate of probability of sucess of trial 1.
P2 = point estimate of probability of sucess of trial 2.
x\ = for i = 1 to n, the trial estimate of the probability of success for
trial 1
*I = for i = 1 to n, the trial estimate of the probability of sucess for trial
2
n = number of replications
"raw" statistic = (P1-P2) with unknown variance
Equation Set 10. Common Random Numbers
(Continued on next page)
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new statistic = a
let L
let d




variance of D = var Ul) + varUf) - 2cov(XJL ,xj)
given common random numbers 2cov(XJ,XJ) is likely > thereby
reducing VAR(D).
Equation Set 10. Common Random Numbers
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to formulate a statistics to test for the incremental improvements in a new
proposed ASW screen shape on the probability of success over the current
method
let p =
't t t t xr-rr
yi'l j'l k=l 1 = 1
t
n
X^ = ASW zone shape as low
Yj = ASQ zone shape as high
j,k,l = high or low
where:
n = number of replicatiions; here (23 x 100) = 800
i = ASW zone shape
j = weapon mode
k = weapon type
1 = state of prior information
f>
= probability of sucessful transit (point estimate)
VAR(p) =rip(l-p) variance is known (binomial form)
significance test:




Equation Set 11. A Suggested Composite Statistic
The final step would be to test the variance of this incremental
improvement of the high value shape factor to see if the range (a distance of the
square root of the variance above and below the point estimate) contains zero. If it
does not, then one could be reasonably confident that there was indeed a significant
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incremental improvement made in adopting an all around ASW screening doctrine
similar to the one hypothesized.
D. SIMSCRIPT II.5 MODELLING DIFFICULTIES
The discussion of the author's difficulties with the SIMSCRIPT II.5 simulation
programming environment should not be construed in a negative light. The topics
discussed below might be encountered by any analyst using a well known and
recognized simulation product. It seems expectable that each new study should stress
a standard programming package in some new way.
The author's over-reliance on the existing SIMSCRIPT II.5 documentation
published by CACIJNC. [Ref.'s 15, 16, 17, & 18] and the lack of interaction with
CACI,INC. consulting services was fatal. Therefore, it can be supposed that some of
the difficulties raised in this section could have been avoided by reliance on the
expert help available from the vendor.
A general comment about SIMSCRIPT II.5 is that its design philosophy is
becoming outdated. Its origins go back to times when computer memory needed to
be conserved. Many of the features of this programming environment are a direct
result of the language's design goal to minimize the consumption of computer
memory. This concern is relevant but should no longer be dominant. The resulting
constraints are too confining for all but academic exercises.
1. Permanent Entity Structure
This first topic deals with a significant setback to the author. The problem,
and my solution to it, illustrate the advantage an expert's contribution could have
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made. SIMSCRIPT II.5 handles objects as one of three types of entities; permanent,
temporary, or compound. Each entity may have have associated attributes and belong
to various sets. A permanent entity's attributes may be addressed using subscripts
which identify the particular player. Temporary entities require some peculiar
constructions in order to be manipulated using subscripts.
Compound entities are a combination of permanent and temporary entities.
Very little information is provided concerning compound entities. It may well have
been that this type of object would have met the requirements of this model's
specification. No further reference will be made to such a compound entity.
Permanent entities are such because they are assigned memory for the
duration of a simulation replication. A temporary entity's memory is allocated and
deallocated during a given replication. A temporary entity construct was chosen for
the weapons. In this instance, since the number of weapons was expected to be large,
it was not deemed prudent to permanently consume memory. Weapon objects were
designed to exist only once fired and to expire upon reaching their target. All other
objects were assigned as permanent entities.
The original design planned on using a multi-dimensional subscript entity
addressing technique. This was desired in order to avoid setting arbitrary limits on
the numbers of players. It was hoped that constraints on the complexity of the
scenario would be a function of the computing machinery and not that of the
analyst's or programming environment's construction.
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It was with dismay that the author discovered that a permanent entity is
really only a one-dimensional array. What was desired was a flexible, ragged array.
It seemed reasonable to expect that an entity attribute should have the capacity to
take on more than one value over the course of a replication; that there should be
some ready provision for a range of values.
It became necessary to select a finite number of players per class of object
and to construct specific arrays with specific names in order to proceed with the
project. This caused an EXCESSIVE redundancy in the program coding. Similar
routines had to be repeated where tightly nested loops would have been sufficient if
multi-dimensional subscripting had been supported. This was an order of magnitude
impact on the number of lines of code produced( 20,000). Editting and compiling
activities became endurance sessions and introduced many opportunities for
hard-to-discover typograhical errors. The result is woefully inelegant code that has
not been fully debugged.
2. System Variable Accessability
As was mentioned earlier, it was required to construct routines to unschedule
particular classes of events (remove them from the event calendar) in order to
proceed to calculate a new most imminent event based on the new state.
SIMSCRIPT II.5 assigns a simulation time value called TIME.A to the temporary
entity which is an event notice, or place holder, in the event calendar. All reference
to this variable is as if it is available to the user for his own manipulation. Initial
design considerations were based on this assumption. It was believed that specific
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events could be maniuplated or unscheduled easily. This was NOT found to be the
case. A redesign of basic program flow was necessary in order to implement a
compromise method of unscheduling specific classes of events. This too contributed
to explosive code growth.
3. Input/Output File Limitations
Due to the design goal of having a rich set of variables with which to
experiment, the debugging process was hampered by the author's inability to open
more than one output file at a time. This resulted in a file size that went beyond the
32,000 line limit of most MS-DOS editors. This necessitated limiting the information
to be recorded for a given set of replications. Explicit commenting of many print
statements was required, and, along with each set of changes, a new compilation was
required.
4. Compiler Idiosyncracies
The working source code file size was approximately 20,000 lines. EACH
compilation on average took 30 minutes on a 386, 25 megahertz, 14 megabytes of
RAM, computer.
The SIMSCRIPT II.5 application environment is known as SIMLAB.
SIMLAB's partial compile capabilty was not seen to operate consistently. Only those
source code modules which have changed from the last compilation are advertised
as needing compilation for a next iteration. This was intended as a time saving
feature. Too often error messages were returned that bore no relation to fact. Use
of this facility was discontinued.
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SIMLAB also contains a built-in text editor. It seems that the compilation
mechanism required a SIMLAB editor file designator before it would operate. This
led to a required conversion sequence which was an annoyance.
5. Run-Time Debug Facility Output
This facility was well designed but lacking somewhat in its execution. Output
was confined to go only to the virtual terminal screen and the display of all variable
values was in hexadecimal notation. Both of these features should be improved as
they needlessly impede the analyst.
6. System Run-Time Errors
The abrupt abort of the SIMLAB debug facilty AND ITS SUBSEQUENT
EXIT of the SIMLAB environment was another setback. All conditions not
anticipated by the product developers were handled in this manner. An expectable
run time error, like an attempt to address a subscripted entity beyond its defined
array boundary, aborted the program. No trace back information was provided. Due
to the amount of redundant code, this was not an uncommon occurance.
The last phenomenon encountered before the coding effort was halted was
the MOST BAFFLING. The SIMLAB compilation routine itself produced this very
abrupt abort condition. No time was left to ascertain what could have caused this
behavior. It would seem reasonable to expect the SIMLAB compiler to produce some
information on all fatal conditions. The offending source code subroutine was
identified but the cause of the error was never isolated. This subroutine calculated
91
which missile was to penetrate next. A similar subroutine for torpedoes compiled
with no errors.
The author is left puzzled as to how a system level routine, such as a
compiler, can suffer a catastrophic failure mode.
E. MODEL AVAILABILITY
THE FULL IMPLEMENTATION OFTHE SIMULATION PROGRAM HAS
NOT BEEN, NOR IS IT INTENDED TO BE, ACCOMPLISHED BY THE
AUTHOR. The reader is cautioned that the computer program developed in this
research has not been completed. Anyone requesting copies of code written to date
must assume that both logic and computational errors still exist. The source code,
such as it is, may be obtained from the author at the following address:
Commanding Officer
Code FW43
Flight Test and Evaluation Group
Naval Air Warfare Center Aircraft Division
Patuxent River, MD 20670-5304
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VI. METHODOLOGY CRITIQUE
As with any simulation model no matter how clever or elegant abstractions and
algorithms, the utility of the results are in large part determined by the quality of
data required to run the model. This is often a primary weakness of most simulation
model analyses.
Some of the data required to use the model developed for this thesis does not
exist. The cumulative distribution functions for attention span and battle damage
were simply hypothesized. The method of determining the mean lifetimes of
detected penetrating objects was also just a construction. Other more familiar data
associated with probability of detection, acoustic or electromagnetic, or reliability
errors, is only partially available on some specific weapons systems performance in
specific environments. Therefore, the reader is cautioned that over on above any
limitations in the abstractions employed, the model specified relies on data which
simply does not exist.
A. UNIQUE CONCEPTS
All simulation model analyses should be accompanied by a discourse on the
prospective impact that key abstractions may have on the study's results. The
discussion presented here will attempt to address those implementation decisions
which are believed to have significance.
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1. Carrier Zones
The notion that the offensive and defensive capabilities of a carrier
battlegroup could be adequately portrayed by a polygonal area with certain
properties is the key abstraction of this model. Any fundamental weakness or mistake
in this step could conceivably make the conclusions of the entire study questionable.
These areas are referred to as Zones one through five, from inside to
outside. Each has its own unique features. Recall that Zone 1 is the carrier iself;
Zone 2 represents that area covered by the carrier's AAW; Zone 3 is that area
covered by surface-to-air missiles; Zone 4 is that area that represents the ASW
screen; and, Zone 5 is that area which is controlled by the carrier's aircraft.
a. Homogeneity
Each set of radii defines a unique isotropic zone of weapon system
capability. The real world is full of holes in coverage or differing densities of
coverage. Thus, it seems that a conservative approach is warranted towards any
results indicated by the model. It has been assumed that the long run average
density exists for each point in the covered region. Therefore, the isotropic property
can be seen to be like an evenly distributed expected value of the density of
coverage.
b. Contiguity
All zones originate at the carrier's position so they overlap. Because the
carrier is maneuvring, it is possible that a penetrator may enter and leave a zone
several times. The object will still expire at its first designated time as a result of an
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initial penetration. In all other respects, zones are considered not to overlap. If an
object is vulnerable in two adjacent zones, then a new computation for successful
transit is required.
c. Absorption Property
This concept is a unique feature of the model. It implicitly suggests the
notion that the carrier must accept and prepare for battle damage. Intimidation of
an adversary is not considered an option. The seriousness of the opposition's intent
to destroy the carrier requires that the carrier expend maximum energy towards
minimizing the opposition's unpenalized time to launch weapons. Therefore, this
absorption formula views the carrier zones as AMOEBA- LIKE MASSES consuming
everything in their path.
Thus, a penetrator can never escape the carrier's influence, allowing the
merger of many separate battlegroup functions into a tractable few. It could be
viewed as a postulation for set of desired qualities more than an abstraction of real-
world properties. Such would be the ideal functioning of a zone; to never let a
detected adversary escape. This implies a certain cost to eliminate the object and
requires sufficient firepower to dominate the engagement. The worst strategy possible
for a naval vessel is to engage a superior force in an exchange of firepower.
Therefore, this absorption notion implies a certain quality of readiness and attention
capacity for the carrier.
The mechanism invoked to achieve the absorption is a series of Monte
Carlo routines where successful passage through the carrier's outer zones always ends
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at its innermost zone. This last arrival results in either the object's or the carrier's
demise. Unlike most Monte Carlo techniques, the decision is not a simple pass or fail
upon entry to new zone. The assignment of a finite lifespan upon meeting the fail
criteria lends a realism to this aspect of the absorption property. Upon detection,
submarines are unlikely to immediately lose their capabilty to consume attention
span or launch weapons.
A weakness in the current specification is that the zones maintain a
constant capacity over time. Only attention span or battle damage can change this
capacity which implies that crews and equipment could sustain peak performance
indefinitely if these factors were to remain unchanged.
2. Carrier Sensors
Two factors deserve mention here. The fact that the carrier was made to rely
solely on remote sensing assets and, that accuracy of these sensors was treated as a
function of time.
Remoteness of the carrier's detecting assets was at first conceived as an
accomodation to the absorption property. The perspective that most ASW searches
are somehow cued from beyond a given carrier's assets seems to justify the initial
decision. The author cannot imagine any positve or negative effects this
implementation might have on experimental results.
Accuracy, as a function of time, was viewed as an expedient proxy for the
combination of factors which affect a sensor systems performance. This was a
defensive decision and meant to avoid gross mistakes in characterizing the complex
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behavior of electromagnetic and acoustic sensor systems and the environment. It was
hypothesised that all of the variables which factored into this behavior could be
reduced to a uniform probability distribution. Rather than have preconceived notions
about the validity of this decision, the author had intended to investigate the
sensitivity of the model's results to slight changes in the critical parameters of this
random distribution function.
3. Carrier Evasive PIM
The nature of an engagement model is to test tactics. Tactics are concerned
with action and counter-action of opposing players. A principal component of any
tactic is the maneuvering to gain tactical advantage. The goal is to give the carrier
some sort of intelligent means of avoiding the threat. The idea of assigning each
carrier way point a weight is appealing. A network optimization problem began to
form. The objective became to find the shortest (least lethal) path.
a. Orthogonal Courses
The carrier's projected arrival times at each grid node is computed. These
times are then used as an input for determining which of each type of submarine
weapons could be within range of of each given node. These calculations use the
carrier's scoreboard knowledge on each detected submarine's HULLNO, COURSE
and SPEED.
It was determined that the carrier would be given perfect knowledge of
each opposing submarine's current onboard weapons load or inventory. This default
condition was chosen since to try to describe the true nature of imperfect knowledge
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seemed too arbitrary. A value equal to the direct hit value of each type of weapon
from every submarine within future range of each node was collected and summed
for each node. This total weight was a danger or lethality value associated with each
node. A weapon was counted more than just once. It added a weight to each node
it could reach for each computed value of a future carrier arrival time which were
sets of grid nodes. This seemed like a fair method for accounting for the potentiality
implied in the calculation.
The carrier's orthogonal PIM segments are converted to near horizontal
or vertical courses to maintain consistency with the Slope Function. The imposition
of collinear or orthogonal course alternatives may, at first glance, appear to be too
restrictive a constraint on the carrier's PIM. However, since new information is
arriving in a reasonable scenario, subsequent calls to this routine will continue to
cause a new carrier PIM to be computed. The carrier's actual historical track does
not appear to have been influenced adversely by this decision.
A description of the effect of this algorithm would have been an ancillary
outcome of the full implementation of this study.
4. Role of Information
Information is what causes significant changes of states in the real system
under study. Therefore, it is the mechanism by which the simulation scenario was
driven. All manipulation of the event calendar was prompted by changes in
information states. Information is finally made available to the objects themselves
as well as to their team members. The TIME of the sighting, the identity of the
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SEEN, its POSITION, COURSE, and SPEED are all there for inspection. These are
posted on that team's scoreboard, the most recent information is posted. The
ultimate effect this may have on simulation outcome is difficult to predict. This
represents yet another candidate parameter to have varied and measured.
The construction of a team network (Scoreboard) for sharing information
directly mimics the real system under investigation. The instant access to information,
once it is on the net, is an artifice that was done for implementation ease. It is not
considered to contribute or detract from the possible outcome of any trial. The time
lag associated with all reported information can be viewed as also accounting for
variance in the real scenario's information systems.
B. OTHER CONCEPTS
Other model concepts that are worth note but not exposition are simply listed
below as a reminder to the reader of the extent and type of limitations in any
specification's design:
1. Cartesian Plane/Linearity/Instantaneous Changes
2. No Interaction With Environment
3. No Interaction With Humans
4. Independence of Attention Span and Battle Damage
5. Attention Span's Restoration Capabilty
6. Battle Damage's Lack of Restoration Capability
7. One Carrier Constraint
8. Zones as 12 Sided Polygons
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9. Player Types, Numbers, Attributes
10. Aircraft and Satellite Fixed PIMs
11. Submarine as Only Shooter
12. Submarine's PIM Given No Attack Criteria
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VII. RESULTS/CONCLUSIONS
The model specified was hard to implement because of its sophistication. I
failed to finish the task.
It is clear that only the first stated goal has been achieved namely, to specify
the simulation model. The maturity of the code is in that uncertain region described
as ALMOST running. No results have been obtained.
Lastly, the analyst attempting any complex or sophisticated study should be
teamed in some cooperative manner with the developer of the simulation
programming environment. Inevitably, both useable system features and undesireable
behavior will be known but UNDOCUMENTED; even by the best of product
developers. Avoidable inefficiencies will be built into the process if this type of
relationship cannot be formed.
The full set of trials posed for the experiment discussed in this paper are
destined to remain a conceptual exercise for this author. A conclusion HAS NOT
proceeded from my premise. However, my belief is that the U.S. Navy should revisit
its ASW Screening policy. This study has produced no supportable indications on this
issue other than to raise it.
In the 1990's there will be threats to U.S. maritime independence that current
U.S. Navy tactical ASW screening doctrine is unable to address.
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APPENDIX A. SIMSCRIPT II.5 DECLARATIVE ROUTINE LISTING
The listing below is the actual source code for the PREAMBLE routine in
SIMSCRIPT II.5 source code. It is intended to provide the reader with a complete
sense of the proposed model's structure and to substantiate the claims made for the
model's richness.
preamble





























































































































































define CV.DEST.X, CV.DEST.Y, CV.SOA,CV.UNREP.INTERVAL,
CV.UNREP.PERIOD, CV.MAX.SEEN.AC, CV.CRUISE.SEEN.AC,
CV.SLOW.SEEN.AC, CV.EM.PROB, CV.X, CV.Y, CV.SLOPE,
CV.STOP.TIME, CV.SCBD.TIME, CV.SCBD.X, CV.SCBD.Y,
CV.SCBD.SLOPE, CV.NEXT.WAY.PT and CV.NEXT.UNREP
as double variables
define CV.IN.PLAY, CV.CLASS, CV.HULL.NO, CV.UNREP.TAG,
CV.LAST.SPEED, CV. MAX. SPEED, CV.CRUISE.SPEED,
CV.SLOW.SPEED, CV.SPEED, CV.BUSY, CV.POINTS, CV.SEES.LS,












































and may belong to a 2LSAC
define LS.EM.PROB, LS.AC.PROB, LS.MAX. SEEN. AC,
LS.CRUISE.SEEN.AC, LS.SLOW.SEEN.AC, LS.MAX.SEER.AC,
LS. CRUISE. SEE R.AC, LS. SLOW. SEER. AC,
LS.AC.UPDATE.INTERVAL, LS.LOW.LATE, LS.HIGH.LATE, LS.X,





define LS. IN.PLAY, LS.CLASS, LS.HULL.NO, LS.MAX.SPEED,
LS.CRUISE.SPEED, LS.SLOW.SPEED, LS.AC.DETECT.RANGE,
LS.PATH.RECORD, LS.PATH.LEG, LS.SPEED, LS.MAX.WEAPON,





































and may belong to a 1RCAC
and may belong to a 1RCEM
and may belong to a 2RCEM
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define RC.WRAP.TIME, RC. START.TIME, RC. START. HIGH,
RC. START. LOW, RC. LOW. LATE, RC.HIG H.LATE,
R C.EM. DETECT. RANGE, RC. AC. DETECT. RANGE,
RCEM.UPDATE.INTERVAL, RC.AC.UPDATE.INTERVAL, RC.X,
RC.Y, RC. SLOPE, RC.CV.DIST, RC.LS.DIST,
RC.TIME.OF.LAST.EVAL, RC.INTERVAL, RC.NEXT.WAY.PT,
RC. NEXT.DETECTION, RC.NEXT. LOSE.CONTACT and
RCNEXT.PENETRATION
as double variables
define RC.IN.PLAY, RC.CLASS, RC.HULL.NO, RC.MAX.SPEED,
RC.PATH.RECORD, RCPATH.LEG, RC.SPEED, RC.SEES.CV.EM,














define IW.READY.TIME, IW.RANGE, IW.RLERR, IW.DHT.RADIUS and
IW.NHT.RADIUS
as double variables



























SETS CORRESPOND TO THE FOLLOWING OPPOSING SIDES:






define 1RCEM as a set ranked by low RC.LS.DIST
define 1RCAC as a set ranked by low RC.LS.DIST
define 2RCEM as a set ranked by low RC.CV.DIST
define 2LSAC as a set ranked by low LS.CV.DIST
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define RDN as a double variable
define EVAL.INTERVAL, TIME.OF.LAST.EVAL, PREF.RANGE,
Z1R1, Z2R1, Z3R1, Z4R1, Z5R1,
Z1R2, Z2R2, Z3R2, Z4R2, Z5R2,
Z1R3, Z2R3, Z3R3, Z4R3, Z5R3,
Z1R4, Z2R4, Z3R4, Z4R4, Z5R4,
Z1R5, Z2R5, Z3R5, Z4R5, Z5R5,
Z1R6, Z2R6, Z3R6, Z4R6, Z5R6,
Z1R7, Z2R7, Z3R7, Z4R7, Z5R7,
Z1R8, Z2R8, Z3R8, Z4R8, Z5R8,
Z1R9, Z2R9, Z3R9, Z4R9, Z5R9,
Z1R10, Z2R10, Z3R10, Z4R10, Z5R10,
Z1R11, Z2R11, Z3R11, Z4R11, Z5R11,
Z1R12, Z2R12, Z3R12, Z4R12, Z5R12,
CAT1.REACT, CAT2.REACT, CAT3.REACT, CAT4.REACT,
CAT5.REACT, CAT1.BUSY, CAT2.BUSY, CAT3.BUSY,
CAT4.BUSY, CAT5.BUSY, BSY1, BSY2, BSY3, BSY4,
BSY5, BSY6, BSY7, BSY8, BSY9, BSY10,
PTS1, PTS2, PTS3, PTS4, PTS5,
PTS6, PTS7, PTS8, PTS9 and PTS10
as double variables
define SOSUS,
NO.REPLICATIONS, NO.RUN, NO.CV.WIN, NO.CV.LOSE,
N0.21A, NO.19, NO.15, NO.650.TORP, NO.533.TORP,
LS.HULL.PEN, BEAR.HULL.PEN,
WEAP.CLASS.PEN, WEAP.HULL.PEN,
SRV.CLASS, SRV.HULLNO and SRV.ZONE
as integer variables
define EVPOINTER as a pointer variable
define RAD 12 as a double function
define RAD1 as a double function
define RAD2 as a double function
define RAD3 as a double function
define RAD4 as a double function
define RAD5 as a double function
define RAD6 as a double function
define RAD7 as a double function
define RAD8 as a double function
define RAD9 as a double function
define RADIO as a double function
ill
define RADII as a double function
define DIST as a double function
define SLOPE as a double function
define .HOURS to mean units
"CV ZONES & PATH
define CV1 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define PIMX as a 2-dimensional, double array
define PIMY as a 2-dimensional, double array
"LS PATH, SURVIVE.MAX, SURVIVE.CRUISE, SURVIVE.SLOW,
WEAPONS & ROF
"OSCAR
define LSI as a 2-dimensional, double array
define LS2 as a 2-dimensional, double array
"SIERR
define LS3 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define LS4 as a 2-dimensional, double array
"AKULA
define LS5 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define LS6 as a 2-dimensional, double array
"KILO
define LS7 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define LS8 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define LS9 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define LS10 as a 2-dimensional, double array
"RC PATH, SURVIVE, SEES.EM.LS & SEES.AC.LS
"P3CU4
define RC1 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC2 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC3 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC4 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC5 as a 2-dimensional, double array
"USSAT
define RC6 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC7 as a 2-dimensional, double array
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define RC8 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC9 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC10 as a 2-dimensional, double array
"BEAR
define RC11 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC12 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC13 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC14 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC15 as a 2-dimensional, double array
"CPSAT
define RC16 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC17 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC18 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC19 as a 2-dimensional, double array
define RC20 as a 2-dimensional, double array
"IW SURVIVE PER WEAPON TYPE
define IW1 as a 1-dimensional, double array
define IW2 as a 1-dimensional, double array
define IW3 as a 1-dimensional, double array
define IW4 as a 1-dimensional, double array
define IW5 as a 1-dimensional, double array
"ARRAYS PER WEAPON TYPE FOR TEMPORARY ENTITIES IBWs
define 1IW as a 1-dimensional, integer array
define 2IW as a 1-dimensional, integer array
define 3IW as a 1-dimensional, integer array
define 4IW as a 1-dimensional, integer array
define 5IW as a 1-dimensional, integer array
end
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APPENDIX B. ASW SCREENING MODEL INPUT SAMPLES
The following examples are those input files used in the DEBUGGING and
verification procedures. Many attributes and probabilities were set to arbitrary
values, or to one, so that the flow of events could be examined for successful
execution. These preliminary selected inputs are exactly those parameters considered
to make a difference in the behavior of the real system under study. For each of the
five separate input files, these attributes are named and listed in the order in which
they are read by the simulation. The listing of these attribute names is followed by
a table of actual values and format used for the model program code( The
SIMSCRIPT II.5 input file methodology is reminiscent of the card-type environment
of Fortran.). No discussion of this data is presented. Although what is shown has
been slightly annotated so as to be somewhat self-explanatory. Titles of files used are
for exposition only. File names are listed in acompanying parentheses.
1. Global Variables( MODEL.DAT)
SOSUS, "SET#1 MAY KNOW SET#2 POSITIONS
NO.REPLICATIONS, "STATISTICAL PRECISION
PREF.RANGE, "WEAPON FIRING RULE'S
CAT1.REACT, "CATEGORIZATION OF TIME TO REACT
CAT2.REACT, "TO INBOUND WEAPONS...
























'BUSY POINTS ASSESSED PER ABOVE
'CATEGORIES
PROBABILITIES OF COUNTERING
'INBOUND WEAPONS BASED ON
"STATE OF ATTENTION SPAN
"SATURATION
"PROBABILITIES OF COUNTERING









03 05 07 10 10
05 04 03 02 01
0.05 0.10 0.25 0.50 0.75 0.85
0.90 0.95 0.97 0.99 0.05 0.10
0.25 0.50 0.65 0.75
0.95 0.99
0.85 0.90





































"PROB OF BEING SEEN
"PROB OF BEING SEEN
"PROB OF BEING SEEN
"PROBABILITY EMITTING RF
"ATTENTION SPAN SATURATION
"BATTLE DAMAGE OR ENDURANCE
"STARTING POSITION
"STARTING POSITION
"WAY POINT LEG OF INITIAL PIM
"EXTREME POINTS OF RADII PER ZONE
ZONE 1 ZONE 2 ZONE 3 zo^JE4
Z1R1 Z2R1 Z3R1 Z4R1 Z5R1
Z1R2 Z2R2 Z3R2 Z4R2 Z5R2
Z1R3 Z2R3 Z3R3 Z4R3 Z5R3
Z1R4 Z2R4 Z3R4 Z4R4 Z5R4
Z1R5 Z2R5 Z3R5 Z4R5 Z5R5



























100 001 999.000 999.000 120.00
048 012 000
025 015 005
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.0 100 1000
000.000 000.000 050
001 001 001 001 001 001
001 001 001 001 001 001
007 007 007 007 007 007
007 007 007 007 007 007
025 025 025 025 025 025
025 025 025 025 025 025
250 250 025 025 025 025
025 025 025 250 250 250
350 350 050 050 050 050
050 050 050 350 350 350
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"PROBABILITY DETECT BY SONAR
"PROB OF BEING SEEN
"PROB OF BEING SEEN






LS.LOW.LATE(A), "LOWER BOUND ON INFO LATE
LS.HIGH.LATE(A), "UPPER BOUND ON INFO LATE
LS.X(A), "STARTING POSITION
LS.Y(A), "STARTING POSITION















"MAX.SPEED SURVIVE PER ZONE
"CRUISE.SPEED SURVIVE PER ZONE






RATE OF FIRE SS-N-21A
"RATE OF FIRE SS-N-19
"RATE OF FIRE SS-N-15
RATE OF FIRE TORP-650MM

















00.0 24.0 08.0 18.0 00.0
00.0 04.0 04.0 06.0 00.0















"LOWER BOUND ON INFO LATE
"UPPER BOUND ON INFO LATE
RCEM.DETECT.RANGE(A), "RANGE OF EM SENSOR
RC.AC.DETECT.RANGE(A), "RANGE OF AC SENSOR
RC.EM.UPDATE.INTERVAL(A),"TRACKING UPDATE
RC.AC.UPDATE.INTERVAL(A),"TRACKING UPDATE
RC.PATH.LEG(A), "WAY POINT LEG LENGTH
RC.START.HIGH(A), "UPPER BOUND ON START POS.
RC.START.LOW(A), "LOWER BOUND ON START POS.







1 300 01 240 000.0 024.0
001.0 002.0 500 250 1.00 1.00
150 000.000 000.000











5. WEAPON DATA( IW.DAT)
IW.CLASS(A), "1-5 PER TYPE
IW.HULL.NO(A), "IDENTITY















SS-N-21A( other four types not shown)





"DIRECT HIT POINT RADIUS
"NEAR HIT POINTS
"NEAR HIT POINT RADIUS
"GRID NODE WEIGHT
"PROBABILITY SURVIVE PER ZONE
0.00
150 025 040 050 015
000.00 000.03 000.06 999.00 000.16
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APPENDIX C. ASW SCREENING MODEL OUTPUT SAMPLES
The following examples are taken from a version of the model which does not
include the routine that defends against inbound missiles( See Chapter V Section B,
1 & 2). Therefore, the scenario described by the output provided has all missiles
successfully launch and penetrate without resistance. Further, DEBUGGING and
verification procedures were in use in this instance such that all Monte Carlo
probabilities were set to one throughout the model so that the flow of events could
be examined for successful execution. These preliminary selected outputs are shown
to give the reader a sense of the model's potential behavior despite its incomplete
state. The data written to the output file for each event is only that which was of
interest to the author and is merely a subset of that available. No discussion of this
data is presented, although what is shown has been slightly annotated so as to be
somewhat self-explanatory. Titles of events correspond to those used in the body of
this report. Those in acompanying parentheses are actual names used in the program
code.
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1. Broadcast to Network (LS_INFO_TO_CV)
LSJNFOTOCV at time .0010 SOSUS = 1
EVALUATE at time .001000
Current Positions:
CV(1) X = .011 Y = .011
LS = 1 X = 100.002 Y = 299.996
LS = 2 X = 300.002 Y = 99.996
LS = 3 X = 50.002 Y = 399.996
LS = 4 X = 150.002 Y = 399.996
LS = 5 X = 400.002 Y = 149.996
LS = 6 X = 400.002 Y = 49.996
LS = 7 X = 50.002 Y = 199.996
LS = 8 X = 150.002 Y = 199.996
LS = 9 X = 200.002 Y = 149.996
LS =10 X = 200.002 Y = 49.996
# SHORTEST PATHS = 3 RANDOM SELECT # = 2 ACTUAL PIM = 251
PIM WAY POINTS in terms of X and Y coordinates:
CV1(6,1) = .011 CV1(6,2) = 199.808
CV1(6,3) = .011 CV1(6,4) = 399.606
CV1(6,5) = .011 CV1(6,6) = 599.404
CV1(6,7) = .011 CV1(6,8) = 799.202
CV1(6,9) = 199.808 CV1(6,10) = 799.202
CV1(6,11) = 199.808 CV1(6,12) = 999.000
CV1(6,13) = 399.606 CV1(6,14) = 999.000
CV1(6,15) = 599.404 CV1(6,16) = 999.000
CV1(6,17) = 799.202 CV1(6,18) = 999.000
2. Penetration of Carrier Zone (IMPENETRATE)
IMPENETRATE at time 5.3825 HULLNO = 1 ZONE




CVi(1) X = 1.356 Y = 134.542
LS = 1 X = 27.172 Y = 276.849
LS = 2 X = 235.733 Y = 139.555
LS = 3 X = 57.674 Y = 408.030
LS = 4 X = 90.349 Y = 298.164
LS = 5 X = 310.180 Y = 145.707
LS = 6 X = 311.709 Y = 65.903
LS = 7 X = 22.109 Y = 165.202
LS = 8 X = 104.590 Y = 176.109
LS = 9 X = 147.936 Y = 177.086
LS = 10 X = 156.686 Y = 88.570
RC=16 X= 309.454 Y= 818.135
3. Detection of Opposition( LS_DETECTION)
LS_DETECTION at time 7.0000
MODE = 2 SEERHULLNO = 6 SEENHULLNO = 7
EVALUATE at time 7.000000
Current Positions:
CV(1) X = 1.760 Y = 174.977
LS = 1 X = 8.199 Y = 241.139
LS = 2 X = 199.689 Y = 157.884
LS = 3 X = 59.180 Y = 415.976
LS = 4 X = 66.323 Y = 246.905
LS = 5 X = 261.965 Y = 140.238
LS = 6 X = 263.722 Y = 73.101
LS = 7 X = 11.092 Y = 134.787
LS = 8 X = 82.887 Y = 152.120
LS = 9 X = 116.247 Y = 183.593
LS =10 X = 130.445 Y = 107.489
RC = 6 X = 223.905 Y = 847.064
4. Broadcast to Network( CV_INFO_TO_LS)
CVINFOTOLS at time 7.2714
SCORE BOARD INFO ON CV:
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TIME CV SEEN was 6.2714
X was 1.578 Y was 156.764
COURSE was 100.00 SPEED was 25
EVALUATE at time 7.271439
Current Positions:
CV(1) X = 1.828 Y = 181.762
LS = 1 X = 5.015 Y = 235.146
LS = 2 X = 193.641 Y = 160.960
LS = 3 X = 59.432 Y = 417.309
LS = 4 X = 62.291 Y = 238.302
LS = 5 X = 253.874 Y = 139.320
LS = 6 X = 255.669 Y = 74.308
LS = 7 X = 10.301 Y = 129.445
LS = 8 X = 79.245 Y = 148.095
LS = 9 X = 110.930 Y = 184.685
LS =10 X = 126.042 Y = 110.664
RC = 6 X = 284.682 Y = 968.415
5. Contact Loss on Opposition (LS_LOSE_CONTACT)
LS_LOSE_CONTACT at time 7.6856 MODE = 2
SEERHULLNO = 6 SEENHULLNO = 1
EVALUATE at time 7.685619
Current Positions:
CV (1) X = 1.932 Y = 192.116
LS = 1 X = .157 Y = 226.002
LS = 2 X = 184.411 Y = 165.654
LS = 3 X = 59.818 Y = 419.344
LS = 4 X = 53.600 Y = 226.700
LS = 5 X = 241.494 Y = 140.380
LS = 6 X = 243.938 Y = 78.404
LS = 7 X = 9.511 Y = 121.199
LS = 8 X = 73.687 Y = 141.952
LS = 9 X = 103.211 Y = 181.678
LS =10 X = 118.524 Y = 114.142
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6. Course & Speed Changes (CVWAYPT)
CV_WAY_PT at time 7.9933
FROM TIME = 7.9929 FROM PLACE = CVWAYPT
EVALUATE at time 7.993315
Current Positions:
CV(1) X = 2.009 Y = 199.808
LS = 1 X = -3.452 Y = 219.209
LS = 2 X = 177.554 Y = 169.141
LS = 3 X = 60.105 Y = 420.856
LS = 4 X = 47.144 Y = 218.080
LS = 5 X = 232.297 Y = 141.168
LS = 6 X = 235.223 Y = 81.447
LS = 7 X = 8.925 Y = 115.073
LS = 8 X = 69.558 Y = 137.389
LS = 9 X = 97.476 Y = 179.445
LS =10 X= 112.939 Y= 116.726
7. Arrival of Reconnaissance (RC_START)
RC_START at time 9.0000 HULL.NO = 17
EVALUATE at time 9.000000
Current Positions:
CVi(1) X = 2.260 Y = 224.974
LS = 1 X = -15.260 Y = 196.984
LS = 2 X = 155.121 Y = 180.549
LS = 3 X = 61.042 Y = 425.801
LS = 4 X = 26.021 Y = 189.880
LS = 5 X = 202.207 Y = 143.746
LS = 6 X = 206.710 Y = 91.401
LS = 7 X = 7.005 Y = 95.031
LS = 8 X = 56.051 Y = 122.459
LS = 9 X = 78.715 Y = 172.138
LS = 10 X = 94.666 Y = 125.180
RC = 17 X = 100.000 Y = 0.
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8. Submarine Weapon Launch (LS_LAUNCH_IW)
LSLAUNCH IW at time 9.4498 IW TYPE = 1 LS HULLNO = 4
CV.SCBD.X = 1.578 CV.SCBD.Y = 156.764
EVALUATE at time 9.449834
Current Positions:
CV(1) X = 2.373 Y = 236.220
LS = 1 X = -20.537 Y = 187.053
LS = 2 X = 145.097 Y = 185.646
LS = 3 X = 61.461 Y = 428.011
LS = 4 X = 16.583 Y = 177.279
LS = 5 X = 188.761 Y = 144.898
LS = 6 X = 193.970 Y = 95.850
LS = 7 X = 6.148 Y = 86.075
LS = 8 X = 50.015 Y = 115.787
LS = 9 X = 70.332 Y = 168.873
LS =10 X = 86.501 Y = 128.958
RC=17 X= 200.666 Y= 201.131
4 no.21A's fired from LS 4 ... call missile.pen.next
PROJECTED HIT TIME at 12.3041
TARGETX = 2.292 TARGETY = 228.117
9. Removal of Opposition Object (REMOVE)
REMOVE at time 9.6407
CLASS = 1 HULLNO = 4
FROM TIME = 9.4498 FROM PLACE = LAUNCHIW
CV.POINTS(l) at entry to this event = 30
EVALUATE at time 9.640717
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Current Positions:
CV(1 ) X = 2.420 Y = 240.991
LS = 1 X = -22.776 Y = 182.839
LS = 2 X = 140.843 Y = 187.810
LS = 3 X = 61.639 Y = 428.949
LS = 4 X = 12.578 Y = 171.931
LS = 5 X = 183.055 Y = 145.387
LS = 6 X = 188.563 Y = 97.737
LS = 7 X = 5.784 Y = 82.275
LS = 8 X = 47.453 Y = 112.956
LS = 9 X = 66.775 Y = 167.488
LS = 10 X = 83.036 Y = 130.561
RC == 17 X = 243.383 Y = 286.480
1-21
A
= 4 X = -1.497 Y = 241.595
PROXIMITY distance to carrier = 3.9635834219
CV.POINTS(l) as a result of this event = -120
( Note: Direct Hit Point Value of SS-N-21A = 150)
10. Replication End & Summary Statistics
(STATS & REPORT)
FROM STATS( only carrier's listing is shown)
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